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The situation of Somali Bantu refugees has been studied in the USA and, to a lesser 
degree, in the refugee camps of Kakuma and Dadaab, but not in self-settled urban contexts in 
East Africa. This qualitative study, a needs assessment of the Somali Bantu refugee community 
in Nairobi, Kenya, contributes towards filling that gap in the literature. Participant observation 
and semi-structured interviews with both Somali Bantu refugees and staff of refugee-serving 
NGOs in Nairobi provided rich ethnographic data. Research questions focused on perceived 
needs and assets of refugees, community support structures, and NGO services available to 
Somali Bantu refugees. The results of the study showed how systems of marginalization and 
oppression found within Somalia are reproduced within the urban refugee environment of 
Nairobi. It also revealed how this marginalization was exacerbated through the systems set up 
by refugee-serving NGOs. However, the study also demonstrated refugee agency and 
aspirations, revealing strategies employed by individual refugees to improve their situation as 
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Hassan had requested to conduct the interview in his ‘home’, a room about 6x6 ft in 
size. Most of that space was taken up by a full-sized bed and a small side-table. A bare light bulb 
hung from the ceiling, and a makeshift power socket provided the means to charge his cell 
phone. On the other side of the door, a narrow hallway ran past similar rooms to the common 
bathroom. There was no space to prepare food, but Hassan offered me a snack from a little bag 
of dates on the side table. He had been living here for almost a year, sharing the tiny space, and 
the single bed, with two other young men to afford the $25 rent per month.  
We get up early in the morning and go out to find work. When we come home, it is 
already dark. We can’t go out at night because of the police and we are tired from work, 
so we just go to sleep.The bathrooms here are not good. To many people share the 
same toilet, and you have to pay extra for water to take a shower. It’s easy to get sick 
that way. 
 
We were both sitting on the edge of his bed, with my audio recorder between us. The sound of 
a dozen children reciting Quranic verses carried through the thin sheet-metal walls of the room 
from the madrassa at the front of the building. Hassan had closed the door for privacy, leaving 
the little room hot and stuffy.  
This is Eastleigh, a neighborhood in Kenya’s capital Nairobi known as “Little Mogadishu” 
for its large Somali community. The first impression of Eastleigh is usually the broad and busy 
1st Avenue with dozens of low-end shopping malls housing thousands of small shops. That part 
of Eastleigh is known as a booming business hub and draws shoppers from all over Nairobi and 
beyond. (Carrier 2017) It’s the place to buy cheap clothes and electronics from China or jewelry 
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and perfume from the Middle East. It is also rumored to be the place to buy weapons or fake 
passports, and many respectable Kenyans from the other side of town would never dare come 
here.  
Venturing deeper into Eastleigh, one finds another side, very much at odds with the 
hustle and bustle and the flashy signs of the shopping malls. The smaller side streets leading off 
1st Avenue are torn-up and muddy, lined with smaller shops, workshops, and roadside 
restaurants. Behind and above these are the apartment buildings of Eastleigh. Ugly concrete 
structures 4-8 floors high, with hundreds of little one-room and two-room apartments, each 
housing several single adults or a large family. Dark staircases are filled with the constant drip 
of water from lines upon lines of laundry hung to dry; narrow hallways lead to shared and dirty 
bathrooms. 
Eastleigh is not a slum. The roads are wider, the buildings taller, and most important, 
the prices are much higher. Because of the booming economy, living in Eastleigh is expensive 
compared with many other low-income neighborhoods. Yet because of the large Somali 
community (both nationals and refugees), many Somali refugees chose to live here, where they 
can best utilize their social and cultural capital. 
I have worked in Eastleigh on and off for more than a decade. Over the years, I had 
numerous opportunities to visit the homes of refugees in Eastleigh, and Hassan’s cramped and 
tiny room was by no means unique. Many Somalis, Ethiopians, and, for that matter, Kenyans 
live in similar situations. What made Hassan different was not his poverty as such, but the fact 
that he was a Somali Bantu refugee, a category that comes with a number of structural barriers. 
I wanted to learn how his situation was shaped by the intersection of his legal status as an 
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urban refugee, his racialized status as what is known in Somalia as jareer, and his ethnic identity 
as a Somali Bantu. 
The first time I met Somali Bantu refugees in Eastleigh was during a short research 
project in October 2017. I was studying the use of Maay, Somalia’s largest minority language, 
among Somalis in Nairobi. My final focus group was organized by Amina, a young refugee lady 
who had recently come from Kakuma refugee camp to finish her education in Nairobi. She 
invited a group of young men and women who she had grown up with in the camp and who 
now all lived in Nairobi. As it turned out, all of them identified as Somali Bantu and asserted 
their identity as distinct of and separate from ethnic Somalis.  
I met Amina and some of her friends again in January 2019 and learned more about 
their stories of fleeing Somalia as young children, growing up in the refugee camps, and being 
compelled to move to Nairobi in search of income opportunities to supplement the decreasing 
aid in the camp. I also learned more about their experiences of systemic marginalization and 
violent racism at the hands of ethnic Somalis. 
At this point, I had studied much of the literature on Somalis in Kenya generally and in 
Eastleigh specifically, and I had not come across any mention of Somali Bantu refugee in 
Nairobi. Amina assured me that “many Somali Bantu” had come to the city in recent years, but 
there was no information regarding the size or demographic characteristics of this population 
or the social structures of their community in Nairobi. I wanted to find out more, and realized I 
would have to start with basic exploratory research.  
At the time, I was connected to the Eastern Mennonite Mission (EMM) in Kenya, and I 
mentioned my interest to several of EMM’s members in Nairobi. I was surprised when the East 
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Africa regional representative came back shortly afterwards to request that I do an assessment 
of the Somali Bantu refugee community in Nairobi for EMM. 
When EMM tasked me with this research project in early 2019, the organization did not 
have any program targeting Somali Bantus in Kenya. However, EMM was one of very few 
international agencies to have worked among Somali Bantu communities in southern Somalia 
prior to the civil war and to maintain some ties with individuals from those communities in the 
diaspora. With ongoing work in the Somali community in Nairobi, the East Africa regional 
representative wanted to explore the possibility of reengaging Somali Bantus in Kenya. 
The Client 
The Eastern Mennonite Mission was founded in 1914 as the Eastern Mennonite Board 
of Missions and Charities by members of Mennonite churches in Lancaster, PA. With its 
headquarters in Salunga, PA, EMM started international programs in the 1930s with four 
missionaries sent to Tanzania in 1934. In the 1950s, the work was expanded to other African 
countries as well as Latin America, Europe, and Asia. In some countries, such as Tanzania and 
Kenya, the work of EMM has led to the establishment of local Mennonite churches, while in 
others, such as Somalia, the focus was on development projects such as schools and hospitals. 
EMM operated programs in Somalia from 1953 until 1976, with numerous missionaries working 
in medical and educational capacities. The work focused on three locations in southern 
Somalia: Mogadishu, the capital city, Mahaday Weyne along the Shabelle river, and Jamaame 
along the Juba river.  
The town of Jamaame, capital of Jamaame district in Lower Juba province of Somalia, 
has a mixed population from different Somali groups. But it is located in a fertile region known 
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as Gosha, populated by Somali Bantu farming communities in small agricultural villages along 
the Juba river. During the 1960s, EMM built and operated both a school and a hospital in 
Jamaame, the latter being the only hospital in the district. Members of the Somali Bantu 
community attended the school and several were trained as medical staff at the hospital. In the 
years following the coup of socialist dictator Siyad Barre in 1969, both the school and the 
hospital were nationalized, and the last EMM staff were ordered to leave the country in 1976. 
Some EMM missionaries relocated from Somalia to Kenya and continued their 
educational program among the Somali community in Eastleigh. The Mennonite Fellowship 
Center in Eastleigh was founded by EMM in 1978 and later handed over to the Kenyan 
Mennonite Church, who continues to operate the center, offering both primary and adult 
education as well as a sports program to their Somali neighbors. EMM staff has continued to 
volunteer at the Fellowship Center, particularly in adult education and sports. These programs 
have targeted residents of Eastleigh in general, with most participants being ethnic Somali 
refugees. 
In the years preceding this project, the East Africa regional representative for EMM was 
Debbie DiGennaro. Based in Nairobi, she oversaw the work of a small team of EMM staff 
scattered across Kenya and the neighboring countries. I had connected with the team through 
their work at the Fellowship Center in Eastleigh and had known Mrs. DiGennaro for some time 
when she sponsored this project in early 2019. 
The Project 
Initially, the needs assessment was designed as a community-based participatory 
research project (CBPR). This was done both out of ethical considerations and to maximize the 
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beneficial impact of the study. CBPR “is a methodological approach to research where 
researchers and community members are actively collaborating on research with the goal of 
improving community well-being, effecting social justice, and/or improving health.” (Cross et al 
2014) For this reason, CBPR is especially appropriate when working with marginalized 
communities such as Somali Bantu refugees in Kenya. Rather than extracting information from 
the community for the benefit of the researcher and the funding partners, CBPR enables 
community members to become part of and exercise control over the research process, 
generating information beneficial for the community. Ideally, CBPR involves community 
participation at every stage of the research process: designing the project and developing 
research questions, collecting and analyzing data, and finally in disseminating the findings. By 
placing control over the research process and the findings into the hands of the community, 
CBPR “aligns well with decolonizing methodologies.” (Stanton 2013)  
In designing this project as community-based and participatory, the goal of the project 
became twofold: On the one hand there were the deliverables agreed upon with EMM as the 
sponsor of the study. On the other hand, the study was intended to (1) provide the Somali 
Bantu community in Nairobi with useful information to improve their situation and (2) use the 
participatory research process to facilitate community dynamics of community development 
and activism. In order to achieve these goals, the study was designed to include the following 
participatory elements: 
1) An initial townhall meeting for members of the Somali Bantu community in Nairobi. 
The meeting was intended to (a) inform community members about the research 
project, receive suggestions regarding the research design, and address concerns, (b) 
allow the community to choose an oversight committee that would monitor the 
research process, enable participants to voice grievances, and control the 
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dissemination of findings, and (c) to identify community members willing to join the 
research team. 
2) Assembling a research team of community members to receive basic training in the 
research methods used and to participate in data collection, analysis, and 
presentation. 
3) A final townhall meeting for the community in which findings would be presented 
and made available to the community, and action steps based on these findings 
discussed. 
I approached my Somali Bantu contacts during the initial design phase of the project in 
February 2019 and explained the study to them. Their response was positive, both in seeing the 
value of the study as such and in agreeing with the participatory nature of the design. They 
proceeded to contact other community members and to organize a first townhall meeting 
without my presence, during which the plan should be discussed and the way forward decided. 
This first meeting was attended by around 50 Somali Bantu men and women, and the result 
was an initial endorsement of the project plan. However, as I was to find out later, the Somali 
Bantu community in Nairobi was not organized in any way and there were no recognized 
leaders. The people who came together for the first meeting chose four community members 
(3 men and 1 woman) as ‘leaders’ to form a temporary committee and oversee the project. 
Nevertheless, it was my initial contacts who organized the second townhall meeting in mid-
March, during which I was asked to present the project to the community. There was a brief 
time to ask questions, and then the people present (around 60 in number) decided to endorse 
the project and give me permission to proceed. It was also at this meeting that I was introduced 
to the oversight committee and to several community members who were interested in joining 
the research team. In addition, the organizer of the meeting passed around a sign-up sheet 
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where people could register as potential interview participants. This was done on their 
initiative. 
Once I had the buy-in of the community, I next sought approval for the project with the 
Institutional Review Board (IRB) at UNT. It was the first time I had done an IRB application and 
the process took longer than I had expected. The application was submitted in early June and 
approved at the end of July, 2019. By that time, I was ready to stat data collection, only to 
discovered that the lives of many community members were too transient to keep their 
interest through the design and approval stage. Several of the most interested people had 
either found a job and were busy, or had moved out of Nairobi altogether. The person who had 
played a key role in organizing the townhall meetings was frustrated with the delay and no 
longer interested in the project and the committee that formed in February was effectively 
disbanded.  
I began to recognize the difficulty of doing a community-based study when there was 
very little sense of community within the population. While the Somali Bantu I interacted with 
had a clear sense of ethnic identity and many were connected to Somali Bantu communities in 
the refugee camps or in Somalia, all agreed that there was no organized or structured 
community in Nairobi. This meant that while I could work together with individual community 
members, I was at a loss as to how to involve Somali Bantus in the research project at a 
community level. At the completion of the project, I was unable to find anybody interested in 
organizing another townhall meeting to present the findings. However, my continued 
involvement with Somali Bantu refugees in Nairobi after the study meant that I could 
disseminate and use findings on an individual level with a number of community members. In 
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addition, the research process and particularly the townhall meetings had started dynamics of 
community-building that I didn’t become aware off until much later. At the writing of this thesis 
in early 2021, a number of young Somali Bantus in Nairobi (several of which had been involved 
in the design of the study) had come together to start a community association with elected 
leaders, and were in the planning to register their origination with the Kenyan authorities. 
While it is difficult to gauge the extent to which the needs assessment contributed to these 
developments, it is my hope that the participatory element of this study contributed in the 
positive developments now visible within the Somali Bantu community in Nairobi. 
The needs assessment was also designed to be ethnographic and exploratory. While 
there was significant literature on both the situation of refugees in Nairobi and on the Somali 
Bantu people in general, there was no data available as to the size or structure of the Somali 
Bantu community in Nairobi. As a needs assessment, the study had to be designed very broad 
and open ended, as health and educational needs would vary significantly based on age and 
gender distribution in the population. The holistic approach of ethnography was well suited to 
this kind of exploratory study. Additionally, it was also exactly the kind of study EMM was 
looking for. As the organization didn’t have any program targeting Somali Bantu at the time, the 
goal was to explore the needs of the community so as to be able to design programs that were 
evidence-based and relevant. I had agreed with my sponsor on the following deliverables: (1) a 
short written report, (2) a verbal presentation to EMM staff and partners. 
In the course of the study, EMM underwent several significant changes in East Africa. 
For one, my contact person, Mrs. DiGennaro, decided to leave Kenya at the end of 2019 and 
end her work with the organization shortly afterwards. EMM was unable to find a replacement 
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for her position, and without the role of regional representative being filled, the oversight over 
the work in East Africa reverted back to the Mission’s Team Director, a US-based role that had 
only recently been filled with Lorrie Bentch. The reduced direct oversight in the region resulted 
in a hiring stop for EMM staff in Kenya and a reduction in the existing work. The implications for 
my project was that I needed to deliver the results before the end of 2019 and that it was 
unclear whether EMM would be able to follow up on them in any way. 
The week of my presentation in mid-December, Mrs. Bentch came to Nairobi for a brief 
visit. Both she and Mrs. DiGennaro attended the presentation and were quite satisfied with the 
results of my study. I was able to continue the conversation with Mrs. Bentch the following year 
to explore ways for EMM to act on my findings. In addition, Mrs. DiGennaro had invited staff 
from several partner organizations and disseminated the report to these partners. Thus, the 
presentation of the findings resulted in a conversation between a number of organizations 







Though anthropology as a discipline developed in the beginning of the 20th century, it 
wasn’t until the 1980s that forced migrants as recognized as an important field of study. While 
many anthropologists had been researching populations that had been massively affected by 
forced migration (Native Americans in the US, colonialized groups in Africa), the theoretical 
perspective of early anthropology made those experiences largely invisible and researchers 
attempted to reconstruct imagined stable societies of the past or, at best, document the slow 
processes of modernization. As Castro (2020) points out, structural functionalism was not well 
suited to addressing drastic social change or ongoing violent conflict. One notable exception 
was the work of Elizabeth Colson, who researched Japanese-Americans in internment camps 
during the second world war and from 1946 onwards studied development-induced 
displacement among the Tonga in southern Africa (Chatty 2014). 
New theoretical paradigms that gained popularity within anthropology in the 1960s and 
1970s provided the needed perspective to better conceptualize forced migration. Victor Turner 
introduced the concept of liminality (Turner 1967) and, more generally, symbolic anthropology 
to the discipline, which enabled anthropologists to understand the experiences of refugees. 
Critical anthropology with its focus on political economy (Wolf 1982), turned the gaze of 
anthropologists on the structures and practices of power that constitute the refugee regime, 
the organizations and institutions that govern and manage forced migrants. 
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Equipped with these new tools, anthropologists took up the field of forced migration in 
the 1980s. In Europe, Barbara Harrell-Bond established the Refugee Studies Centre (initially as 
the Refugee Studies Programme) at the University of Oxford in 1982 and served as its director 
until 1996. Under her leadership, the center became the focal point of scholarship on forced 
migration and has been publishing the Journal of Refugee Studies since 1988. Harrell-Bond 
recognized the need for an interdisciplinary approach to the study of refugees and included 
political scientists, legal scholars and other academics into the core of the program (Chatty 
2014). During her fieldwork among Ugandan refugees in South Sudan in the early 1980s, 
Harrell-Bond had turned her focus on the structures and practices of the humanitarian 
organizations assisting the refugees, resulting in a critique of the refugee regime in her seminal 
book Imposing Aid: Emergency Assistance to Refugees (1986). During this same time period, the 
American Anthropological Association recognized the importance of forced migration with the 
establishment of the Committee on Refugees and Immigrants (CORI) within the General 
Anthropology Division (Lewellen 2002). 
The 1990s saw a drastic expansion in the study of refugees caused by new refugee-
producing crises (for example, in Yugoslavia, Somalia, and Rwanda), but also by an increased 
theoretical focus on mobility and transformation with the work of Arjun Appadurai (1996) on 
globalization, as well as the deconstruction of culture by Akhil Gupta, and James Ferguson 
(1992). Liisa Malkki (1992, 1995) introduced Gupta and Ferguson’s social constructivism and 
Appadurai’s concept of the social imaginary into the field of refugee studies, resulting in a 
vigorous debate on territorialization and the ‘sedentarist’ bias within academia. Based on her 
fieldwork conducted among Hutu refugees in Tanzania, she argued that the link between 
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people, cultures and territory is socially constructed rather than naturally given, as was long 
assumed by anthropology. In exile, refugees create imagined communities based on imagined 
homelands as powerful uniting symbols (Chatty 2014). 
Another concept that received increased attention during the 1990s was 
transnationalism. While theorizing globalization focused on the macro-level of global cultural 
and economic flows, the perspective of transnationalism brought these flows to bear on the 
micro-level in the lives of migrants and their communities. Thus, it provided a powerful way to 
conceptualize social networks and identities of refugees across national borders (Brettel 2000). 
Transnationalism continues to be a key concept in the study of forced migrants. 
Since the turn of the century, the number of anthropologists studying refugees and 
other forced migrants has increase significantly, and the field has broadened to encompass 
virtually every part of the world and every aspect of forced migration (Chatty 2014). 
A fundamental and recurrent theme within the anthropology of refugees and migrants 
concerns the legitimacy of refugee studies as a field in itself, and the relation to the broader 
field of migration studies. Anthropologists of migration have tended to view refugees as simply 
one form of migrants (Brettel 2000), addressed within the sub-field of forced migration. Other 
scholars have argued that refugees as a group are distinct enough to warrant their own 
category and field of study (Hathaway 2007). The dilemma at the core of this debate is that 
‘refugee’ is defined as a legal status conferred by the UNHCR and government agencies, rather 
than the description of a social reality as studied by anthropologists. Consequently, there are 
many different experiences found within the category of refugee, some of which are very 
similar to those of other migrants, while on the other side many migrants who might qualify as 
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refugees under other circumstances are denied that status by host governments. Over the last 
decades especially, the category has become more politicized and at the same time more 
fragmentized, leading to new labels and fewer refugees (Zetter 2007).   
Responding to this fragmentation of forced migrants, anthropologists have expanded 
their gaze beyond refugees to other categories such as undocumented immigrants (de Leon 
2015, Anderson 2014), asylum seekers (Fassin and D’Halluin 2005, Heath Cabot 2012), or 
internally displaced people (Kett 2005, Duncan 2005, Whyte et al. 2013). Others have studied 
differences between refugee sub-groups such as camp vs urban refugees (Agier 2002, Oka 
2011), those resettled into third countries (Eastmond 2011, Fozdar and Hartley 2013) or those 
repatriated to their home country (Hammond 2004, Ecke et al. 2016). And yet other 
anthropologists have looked at how refugees themselves navigate the various labels both in the 
re-interpretation of their social identities and in their interactions with various government and 
humanitarian agencies (Peteet 2005). 
Rather than delving into the literature on forced migration in anthropology in general, 
the following section reviews relevant literature on refugees in Kenya. 
Refugees in Kenya 
Kenya has hosted refugees for a long time and has signed both the 1951 Refugee 
Convention and the 1969 OAU Convention on the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in 
Africa. However, the government did not pass any national legislation on refugees until the 
Refugee Act of 2006; before that, refugees in Kenya lived in a legal limbo and were governed by 
policy, rather than by law (Nanima 2017). These policies were initially generous and hospitable 
to refugees, giving them the right to reside in urban areas and move freely throughout the 
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country, access education opportunities and apply for work permits. The Kenyan government 
determined refugee status on an individual basis through the Kenyan Eligibility Committee, 
while the UNHCR and foreign NGOs played a negligible role in the administration of refugees 
(Verdirame 1999). 
In 1991-1992 Kenya saw a huge influx of refugees from conflicts in Uganda, Sudan, 
Ethiopia, and especially Somalia. The refugee population increased from just 12,000 in 1990 to 
120,000 in 1991 and over 400,000 in 1992 (Campbell 2005). Overwhelmed by these numbers, 
government policies changed drastically. Unable to continue individual status determinations 
and unwilling to integrate all these refugees into urban society, the Kenyan government 
decided that refugees were to reside in camps administered by the UNHCR and serviced by 
international NGOs. This meant an influx of foreign resources to aid refugees, but it also 
increased the legal vacuum for refugees as the government stopped its own refugee status 
determinations. The UNHCR took over the process and made the decisions on who was and 
who wasn’t a refugee. Recognized refugees were provided with a ‘protection letter’ as the only 
form of identification (Verdirame 1999). 
The majority of refugees arriving in Kenya in 1991-1992 came from neighboring Somalia, 
where a civil war had overthrown the central government before disintegrating into clan-based 
warfare between competing warlords. Refugees either arrived over land at the Somali-Kenyan 
border, or via boat at the coastal city of Mombasa. Most of those arriving by sea were 
inhabitants of Somalia’s coastal cities and many belonged to minority groups. They were settled 
in several camps in the Mombasa area, and many quickly integrated into the local economy 
(Verdirame 1999). Many of those arriving at the land border came from rural areas and 
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agricultural or nomadic backgrounds. The UNHCR established three camps around the small 
town of Dadaab in Northeastern province, an arid part of the country inhabited by ethnic 
Somalis. In addition, a refugee camp was set up next to Kakuma town in Turkana province in 
northwestern Kenya for refugees arriving from Sudan, and later in the 1990s for refugees from 
Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of Congo. Between 1994-1997 the Kenyan government 
closed the camps around Mombasa and declared that all refugees should be relocated to either 
Dadaab or Kakuma. Most ethnic Somalis were taken to Dadaab, while members of minority 
groups who felt threatened by majority clans there were instead relocated to Kakuma. 
Thousands of refugees refused either option and instead self-settled into coastal communities 
where they already had ethnic or social connections (Verdirame 1999). 
During the 1990s, Kenya became increasingly inhospitable for refugees, with few 
opportunities for integration and rising levels of xenophobia. Refugees were supposed to stay 
in remote camps, and the government did not officially recognize the existence of urban 
refugees, labeling them instead ‘illegal aliens’. In 1997, the police followed a presidential 
directive against ‘spies and criminals’ to crack down on the refugee community in Nairobi, 
arbitrarily arresting and detaining hundreds. After the 1998 bombing of the US-embassy in 
Nairobi by al-Qaida, government operations against refugees in the name of national security 
became more frequent, with over 600 refugees arrested in 1999 and over 1,000 refugees in 
2002 (Campbell 2005).  
The 21st century saw two parallel developments regarding refugees in Kenya. On the 
one hand, the 2006 Refugee Act and the 2010 Constitution increased the rights of refugees. The 
Refugee Act ratified the international conventions and thus allowed refugees freedom of 
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movement and the right to apply for work permits. It also established the Department of 
Refugee Affairs (Nanima 2017). The 2010 Constitution provided for a pathway to permanent 
residency and citizenship to refugees who had legally resided in Kenya for more than 7 years.  
On the other hand, the global war on terror after 9/11 increased the securitization of 
the refugee regime. Without a functioning government, war-torn Somalia had become a haven 
for terrorists and organized criminals and the Kenyan government had legitimate concerns 
regarding security threats from Somalia. These increased after the emergence of the al-
Shabaab terrorist group in Somalia in 2008, and the infiltration of Muslim communities in Kenya 
by al-Shabaab in the following years. A number of terrorist attacks in Kenya attributed to al-
Shabaab in 2011-14 brought national security to the forefront of public discourse, and refugees 
from Somalia provided a convenient scapegoat. All of this resulted in presidential directives and 
government policies that stood in contrast to the provisions of refugee law. Numerous times 
between 2012 and 2019 the Kenyan government ordered the closure of urban refugee 
registration centers and the relocation of urban refugees to the camps, as well as the complete 
closure of the Dadaab refugee camps. Most of these directives were struck down in court, but 
the result has been considerable legal ambiguity and administrative chaos (Namani 2017, 
Freeman 2019, Balakian 2020). In 2016, the government disbanded the Department of Refugee 
Affairs on short notice and replaced it with the Refugee Affairs Secretariat (RAS). It also revoked 
the right of UNHCR to conduct refugee status determinations and instructed RAS to implement 
refugee registration and status determination, resulting in new and confusing procedures and 
documentation. Since then, asylum seekers in urban centers have been registered there, but 
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subsequently ordered to move to Kakuma or Dadaab camps for status determination (NRC & 
IHRC 2017). 
The situation of refugees from Somalia is complicated by the fact that Kenya is home to 
a sizeable Somali population indigenous to northeastern Kenya. The largest Kenyan Somali clans 
are also found in southern Somalia and eastern Ethiopia, with transnational social and 
economic networks going back generations. As a result, many Somali refugees in Kenya have 
local relatives or clan members who can offer support and facilitate integration. In fact, 
refugees who are members of Somali clans found in Kenya are often able to acquire Kenyan 
national ID cards through local government officials from their clan. In return, some 
impoverished Kenyan Somalis have obtained refugee documentation to benefit from the aid 
provided by the refugee regime (Horst 2006). As a consequence, even legitimate 
documentation of Kenyan Somalis is often viewed with suspicion and Kenyan Somalis are 
targeted as ‘illegal immigrants’ and security threats (Lochery 2012, Scharrer 2018, Mohamed 
2017). On the other hand, common clan membership has facilitated many successful business 
partnerships between Somali refugees and Kenyan Somalis, where refugees benefit from the 
legal privileges and the social capital of Kenyan Somalis, who in turn capitalize on the 
transnational networks refugees bring with them to access global supply chains and new 
markets. A number of studies on the economic activities of Somalis in Kenya include both 
refugees and nationals and analyze the economic relationships between both groups. (Elliott 
2014, Carrier & Lochery 2013, Carrier 2017, Carrier & Scharrer 2019). 
Kenya’s refugee camps have received significant attention from academic and applied 
scholars, including those writing from the vantage of anthropology. Critical studies of the 
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refugee regime have focused on violence and insecurity (Crisp 2000, Newhouse 2015, Wirtz 
2017) as well as policing and managing of refugees (Jaji 2011, Brankamp 2019). Others have 
studied the strategies refugees employ vis a vis the refugee regime in the construction of 
vulnerability (Jansen 2008, Perouse de Montclos 2008) and the assertion of dignity (Oka 2014). 
There has been increased interest in the economics of Kakuma and Dadaab refugee camps 
(Perouse de Montclos 2000, Horst 2006 IFC 2018) as well as economic strategies employed by 
refugees (Tegenbos and Büscher 2017, Betts et al 2020) and refugee-host relationships (Aukot 
2003). A few studies have looked at the marginalization (Iazzolino 2020) and persecution 
(Adelman 2005) of minority groups by other refugees. 
If anything, urban refugees in Nairobi have drawn even more scholars. Despite the 
numbers of urban refugees being significantly lower than those of camp refugees (80,000 vs 
415,000 UNHCR registered refugees in mid-2020), and the fact that urban refugees are more 
difficult to identify and access, there is no lack of both academic and applied publications on 
Nairobi’s refugees. With very little support from the UNHCR or NGOs, these refugees are 
generally self-settled and more or less self-reliant. A number of studies focus on survival 
strategies (Hough 2013, Boeynik 2017), structural vulnerability (Tippens 2017, Muhereza 2012, 
Wagacha and Guiney 2008) and legal barriers (Balakian 2016, Clapier & Winterø 2015, 
Pavanello et al 2010). Other studies cover the economic situation (Lindley 2007, Carrier & Elliot 
2018, Campbell 2006, UNHCR 2012) and healthcare (IOM 2013, Arnold et al 2014, Im et al 2017, 
Mutiso et al 2018). Most of these studies focus on the Somali refugees in Eastleigh, by far the 
largest urban refugee population in Kenya. 
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Somali Bantu Refugees 
Introduction 
The anthropology of Somalia began with I.M. Lewis, a British social anthropologist who 
conducted fieldwork for the Colonial Office in British Somaliland in the late 1950s. Working 
within a structural-functionalist perspective (he was a student of A. R. Radcliffe-Brown), he 
focused on traditional political systems of the Somali, published in his book A Pastoral 
Democracy (1961). Lewis went on to become the preeminent scholar of Somali Studies, writing 
dozens of books and articles on Somali history, society, culture, and religion. While Lewis wrote 
on Somalis in southern Somalia, Kenya, and Ethiopia, his research primarily focused on 
northern Somalia (currently: Somaliland), and he has been accused of writing with a northern 
bias. His strong functionalist emphasis on the Somali clan system was eventually met with 
severe criticism, especially after his analysis of Somali society was used to explain the civil war 
in terms of clan warfare (Besteman 1996a).  
Lewis’ student Virginia Luling followed in his footsteps, conducting her dissertational 
research in the 1960s in Afgoye, a town in southern Somalia, and becoming a respected scholar 
of Somali and Oromo studies, as well as a fierce advocate for minority groups in Africa and an 
expert witness in many Somali asylum cases. Her fieldwork in southern Somalia had brought 
her in contact with marginalized groups, and in 1983 Luling published an article on minority 
groups in Somalia, providing a brief overview of the different groups and attempting to 
reconstruct their history (Luling 1983). However, Luling did not attempt to critically analyze the 
structures of oppression or the social impact of marginalization on these minority groups. 
In the 1980s, Bernhard Helander, a Swedish anthropologist, studied the Rahanweyn 
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clans of the Baay region in southern Somalia. Like Luling, he came to observe low-status groups 
integrated into these clans, which he estimated to account for up to 30% of the Rahanweyn 
clan federation of southern Somalia (Helander 1995). However, he didn’t focus his research on 
these minority groups, possibly because his theoretical perspective aligned too closely with 
Lewis, as Besteman (1999) contends.  
This perspective was challenged in the late 1980s with three dissertational projects 
focused on the Juba river region in southern Somalia: The anthropologists Francesca Declich 
(1992) and Catherine Besteman (1991) and the political scholar Ken Menkhaus (1989) all 
studied the minority groups that later became known as the Somali Bantu. Their close 
connection with these communities just a few years before the outbreak of the Somali civil war 
in 1991 shaped their careers in significant ways, and all three have continued to research and 
publish on the Somali Bantu people.  
Catherine Besteman, in particular, framed her research within the theoretical 
perspective of critical theory, focusing on social stratification on the basis of race and class 
(Besteman 1999a).  Her articles on the social and political collapse of Somalia in the 1990s were 
very critical of Lewis’ clan-based perspective and received a heated backlash from both Lewis 
and Helander. The ensuing debate (Besteman 1996b, 1998, 1999b, Lewis 1998, 2000, Helander 
1998) lasted through the end of the decade and ended with harsh personal attacks on 
Besteman by Lewis, who he described as “very ignorant, extremely pretentious, and totally 
lacking in serious scholarship” (Geshekter 2000). 
By this time, scholarship on Somalia had shifted significantly, with a new generation of 
social scientists (both Somali and non-Somali) embracing what Lewis saw as “the most negative 
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influences in anthropology”, namely Marxism and post-modernism (Geshekter 2000). Two 
edited volumes, The Invention of Somalia (Ahmed 1995) and The Struggle for Land in Southern 
Somalia (Besteman and Cassanelli 1996) contained an interdisciplinary collection of articles 
calling for a reinterpretation of the social processes that led to the civil war in Somalia as well as 
revision of the ‘myths’ created by Western scholarship about Somali history and society. While 
many of these scholars appreciated Besteman’s contribution to the field, few completely 
agreed with her conclusions on the role of race in Somalia (Abdi 2000, Kapteijns 2001). 
Ali Jimale Ahmed, Abdi M. Kusow, and Mohamed Haji Mukhtar are among the Somali 
scholars who contributed to The Invention of Somalia, although not from an anthropological 
perspective. All three come from southern Somalia and are critical of the ‘northern’ bias of 
scholars like Lewis, a bias that can be found among Somali academics, as well. In 2001, for 
example, Mohamed Diriye Abdullahi, a Somali linguist, published the popular Culture and 
Customs of Somalia, a book that is written very much from an egalitarian, clan-based northern 
perspective and barely acknowledges the existence of southern minority groups. 
While Besteman (2016), Declich (2020), and Menkhaus (2010) continue to publish work 
regarding the Somali Bantu groups of the Juba River, the cause of the Somali minority groups 
has been championed most passionately by two of their own, Omar A. Eno and Mohamed A. 
Eno, two brothers who ran a ESL school in Mogadishu during the 1980s before fleeing the 
country and subsequently pursuing academic careers. The late Omar Eno was a historian and 
faculty member at Portland State University, where he co-published The Somali Bantu: Their 
Culture and History (2003). Mohamed Eno is an educator and faculty member at ADNOC 
Technical College in Abu Dhabi, as well as professor of African Studies at St. Clemens University 
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Somalia and a prolific author of academic articles on the situation of the Somali Bantu minority 
groups. 
The Somali Bantu 
Although Somali society has been called homogenous, egalitarian, and democratic, 
there are actually several layers of social stratification. The most obvious one is the clan 
structure. Somalis are organized into clans through patrilineal descent in a system I. M. Lewis 
calls a segmentary lineage-based society. On a practical level, the smallest social unit is the 
‘jiffo-paying unit’, which includes all the descendants of a common ancestor 3-4 generations 
back. The next larger significant unit is the ‘diya-paying unit’, a descent group of around several 
thousand members. Above these are the primary lineages, the clans, and finally, the clan-
families. The smaller units are bound together by social contract (xeer) to support each other. 
Larger units, such as the clan, are important on the level of state or national politics (Lewis 
1994). 
The clan system is one of the most important social resources for individuals in daily life. 
These days, most diya-paying units are organized into social media groups to keep each other 
informed of important events or needs among group members. In many cases, regular fees are 
collected to take care of the most destitute; additionally, the diya-paying group is mobilized in 
emergencies (e.g. to cover medical bills or funeral costs) and to make economic investments. In 
the context of the Somali civil war, both the diya-paying groups and entire clans (numbering 
hundreds of thousands of members) are crucial for physical protection, with larger clans 
operating heavily armed militias.  
Within this system, belonging to a small clan comes with serious disadvantages. While 
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some small clans are very prestigious and have a high social status (for example, the religious 
clans of the Ashraaf and Sheykhaal), during the height of the civil war in the 1990s, members of 
small clans were disproportionately targeted by violent criminal gangs, regardless of their 
status. Members of smaller clans can also experience more difficulties in raising funds or finding 
assistance within their clan networks (OCHA 2002). 
These disadvantages become even more pronounced for those who do not fit into the 
clan system at all. Many of the Somali Bantu living along the Shabelle and lower Juba rivers 
form their own social groups and are not members of any Somali clan. The same is true for 
some of the low-caste occupational groups scattered across Somalia and for the traditional 
urban populations of the ancient cities of southern Somalia (e.g. the Reer Hamar and the 
Bravanese). These groups have been called looma ooye (“the ones no one cries for”) by other 
Somalis as a sign of their lack of social and military support (MRGI & IIDA 2015). 
While the clan system is codified in traditional Somali law, two other important social 
distinctions function on a less formal level. One is based on a concept of purity and divides 
Somalis into ‘noble’ and ‘commoner’ (these are terms used within the academic literature, 
although I was not able to find a Somali term for ‘commoner’; instead, nobility is juxtaposed 
simply with a lack of nobility). While most Somalis consider themselves as noble, many clans 
contains entire lineages who are low-caste because they are considered ritually impure. In 
many cases, their impurity is explained through legends in which the ancestor of the lineage 
broke some kind of taboo, often by eating food that was forbidden. Traditionally, intermarriage 
between nobles and commoners is forbidden, and in many cases this practice is still enforced 
on a family level (Menkhaus 2003). 
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The third social distinction in Somalia is a racial one. Somali society differentiates two 
different racial categories based on physical features. The term jileec (‘soft’) refers to the soft 
curly hair found among most Somalis and related groups in the Horn of Africa, while jareer 
(‘hard’) denotes the harder, more kinky hair common among some of the Somali minority 
groups as well as most East Africans. Thus, Somali racial categories are not primarily based on 
skin color (there are some Somali groups referred to as ‘white’, but darker skin does not 
connote a different social status) but on hair texture, as well as on facial features (round vs long 
faces and thin vs broad noses) associated with ‘hard-hair’ and ‘soft-hair’ people (Besteman 
1999). 
Ken Menkhaus estimates the percentage of the jareer population at 5%-10% of the 
entire population of Somalia (Menkhaus 2010), constituting the largest minority group in the 
country. However, this minority group is by no means homogenous, and traditionally there has 
not been a common ethnic identity among the various jareer groups scattered across southern 
Somalia. Three main categories of jareer can be distinguished, although these categories should 
not be viewed being static or having clear-cut boundaries.  
The first group of jareer are those who belong to a Somali clan. As Helander noted in the 
1980s, most clans of southern Somalia contain some lineages who are considered to be jareer. 
In some cases, these lineages even make up the majority of the clan, as with the Eelay around 
Baidoa, or constitute an entire clan within the Rahanweyn clan federation, as with the 
Gobaweyn of Luuq or the Eyle of Buur Hakaba. Belonging to a Somali clan, these groups are 
more integrated into majority Somali society than others. The clan system places certain 
obligations on them, but also afford a certain measure of protection and support. Nevertheless, 
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they are not viewed as ethnic Somalis by their fellow clan members, and in the early years of 
civil war aid workers noticed that these jareer lineages were severely discriminated against in 
the distribution of food, with many starving to death as a result (Menkhaus 2003). 
The second group of jareer are those found along the Shabelle River in southern 
Somalia. They live in distinct communities with their own ethnic identities, such as the 
Makanne, the Shiidle, or the Shabelle. Traditionally, these communities have existed in patron-
client relationships with the surrounding Somali clans. They speak the dialects of their Somali 
neighbors and many individuals have migrated to nearby urban centers, particularly to the 
capital Mogadishu. However, these groups generally with themselves as the initial inhabitants 
of southern Somalia and speak of the Somali clans as arriving later. Some scholars have 
speculated that these jareer communities form the northernmost expansion of the Bantu 
peoples from central Africa, or that they were part of the legendary precolonial Bantu kingdom 
of Shungwaya (located somewhere in southern Somalia). However, as these groups have no 
memory of ever speaking a Bantu language, they generally dislike being called Somali Bantu 
(Eno & Kusow 2014). 
The third group of jareer are the communities found along the lower Juba river of 
Somalia, primarily around the towns of Jilib and Jamaame, in a forested area called gosha. The 
inhabitants of the gosha are unique in that they are able to trace their ancestry to a number of 
Bantu-speaking groups in East Africa countries such as Tanzania and Mozambique. The 
ancestors of these communities were brought to Somalia in the 19th century as part of the Arab 
slave trade. Enslaved to Somali masters, they were forced to work in the cities of the Banadir 
region and on plantations along the lower Shabelle river during a time when southern Somalia 
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experienced increased integration into the global capitalist economy. Starting in the 1840s, 
freed or escaped East African slaves settled in the remote area of the gosha, where they 
organized themselves into agricultural villages based primarily on ethnic affiliation. In the late 
19th century, these villages formed a confederation called the Shanta Shabarra under the 
leadership of the legendary Nassib Bundo, able to resist the raids of neighboring nomadic clans 
and eventually rising to be a valuable trading partner within the network of East African coastal 
cities (Declich 2020). 
Menkhaus (2003) and Besteman (1999) documented a history of discrimination and 
disenfranchisement faced by these ex-slave communities as the Lower Juba region became 
more integrated into the Somali state during the 20th century and the Somali elites began to 
recognize the value of the agricultural land held by them. Underdevelopment and dispossession 
turned into horrific violence in the early years of the civil war. Many thousand jareer villagers 
fled across the desert into neighboring Kenya with traumatic accounts of killings, sexual 
violence, and starvation. Most of these refugees were received by Kenyan authorities and 
placed in the Dadaab camps of Eastern Kenya, where they again ended up as a minority group 
among ethnic Somalis. Dan van Lehman and other UNHCR officials in the camp noticed the 
continued racial discrimination these minorities experienced in the Dadaab camps and began to 
advocate for special protection. It was as this point that the term Somali Bantu was first coined 
to signify jareer refugees from Somalia. Through the advocacy of Van Lehman and others, the 
United States government recognized the Somali Bantu as a vulnerable minority group and 
granted resettlement status to the entire community. Between 2003 and 2006, 12,000 Somali 
Bantu refugees were resettled to the US in one of the largest group resettlement programs. But 
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many other stayed behind – some because they did not neatly fit into the racialized stereotypes 
of Somali and UN workers alike, others because more influential Somali refugees corruptly 
obtained their resettlement places within the UNHCR bureaucracy, and yet others because they 
had self-settled along the Kenyan coast or returned to their homes in Somalia (Besteman 2016). 
Several scholars have analyzed the construction of the ethnic identity of the Somali 
Bantu through the experience of forced displacement and encampment (Declich, 2000, 
Menkhaus 2010, Besteman 2012). The Somali Bantu label was quickly recognized as a valuable 
resource vis a vis the humanitarian regime, increasing chances of special protection and third-
country resettlement, and from its initial use in the refugee camps, the label has now spread 
back to the IDP camps of Somalia. Among many refugees in Kenya and among those resettled in 
the US, however, being Somali Bantu is no longer just a label, but an ethnic identity. 
Nevertheless, this identity is somewhat ambiguous, and especially the jareer groups who do not 
remember a Bantu ancestry are reluctant to adopt it. Instead, the term jareer, which is 
primarily used in a derogatory by ethnic Somalis, has been reappropriated by many in the 
community as a self-identifier and filled with positive connotations. Some of the community 
leaders now speak of belonging to the Jareerweyne (the jareer nation). Somali Bantu scholars 
Omar Eno and Mohamed Eno have used both terms side by side (“Bantu Jareer Somalis”) to 
include both groups (Eno 2008, Eno et al 2010). 
Somali Bantu Studies 
With the arrival of 12,000 Somali Bantu refugees in the US, scholars across many 
disciplines started to study this community. Some focused on the initial resettlement 
experience and the process of integration (Waweru 2008, Baker 2008, Sekhon 2008, Smith 
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2010, Frounfelker et al 2017) or on identity formation (Deramo 2016, 2018, Bjork 2016, Shapiro 
& MacDonald 2017) and the memories of trauma and loss (Ghazali 2010). A number of studies 
were done from an educational perspective, focusing on the challenges and barriers faced by 
Somali Bantu children (Roxas 2008, 2010, Roy 2008, Roy & Roxas 2011, Roxas & Roy 2012, 
Birman & Tran 2015, 2017) and on ESL and literacy among adults (Colleen 2006, Lynch 2009, 
Dyer 2016). Healthcare proved to be another important focus (Springer 2010, Julie 2011, 
Deckys & Springer 2013, Beatson 2013, Schuster et al 2019, Assefa et al 2020), often with an 
emphasis on reproductive healthcare among women (Shamalla-Hannah 2007, Upvall et al 2009, 
Brown et al, Gurnah et al 2011, Feresu & Smith 2013, Agbemenu 2017), on health education 
(Eisenhauer et al 2012, Jacoby et al 2015), or on mental health (Baker 2007, Frounfelker et al 
2020). Other studies included issues of parenting (Reinke 2010, Bailey 2020) and adolescence 
(Grady 2015), on economic self-sufficiency (Smith 2012, 2013), and on human rights (Coughlan 
et al 2015, Van Lehman & McKee 2019). As there were no significant Somali Bantu refugee 
communities in other Western countries, these publications all focus on the US.  
In contrast to the situation in the US, there are few studies on Somali Bantu refugees in 
Kenya or on the Somali Bantu community in Somalia. Although Somali Bantus make up a 
significant portion of IDPs in the urban camps of Mogadishu, Kismayo, and other cities of 
southern Somalia, security concerns make academic studies virtually impossible. A notable 
exception is the work of Somali Bantu scholar Mohamed Eno, who conducted fieldwork 
throughout southern Somalia for his dissertation (Eno 2005) as well as for subsequent articles 
(Eno 2014, Eno & Eno 2010). Other academic work generally relies on interviews with Somali 
Bantus in neighboring countries (Hoehne 2014) or the US (Besteman 2016) Applied research in 
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Somalia that includes Somali Bantus as a significant minority group has been conducted by 
government agencies (DIS 2000), the United Nations (OCHA 2002) and non-governmental 
organizations (Hill 2010, 2015, Beanstead et al. 2019).  
In Kenya, Francesca Declich documented the process of identity formation among 
Somali Bantu refugees (Declich 2000), as well as the resettlement of Somali Bantus with 
Tanzanian ancestry in Tanzania (Declich 2010, 2018). In a recent article, Gianluca Iazzolino 
documented the relationship between Somalis and Somali Bantus in the Kakuma refugee camp 
in northern Kenya (Iazzolino 2020), giving a detailed account of the marginalization and 
domination experienced by Somali Bantu refugees during his fieldwork in 2013-2014. 
Iazzolino’s research included a significant number of interviews with Somali Bantus in Nairobi; 
unfortunately he does not provide any information regarding their situation there. He merely 
mentions that is was common among Somali Bantu refugees to send “the breadwinner of the 
family, typically the most common young male, to travel to urban centres, usually Eastleigh, 
where they would hope to find a job and send remittances back to their families in the camp.” 
(2020:22) In addition to these remittances, camp-based family members were also able to sell 
or trade the food rations intended for this person (2020:23).  
Considering the breadth of the literature on refugees in Kenya generally, and Somali 
refugees in particular, the relative paucity of Somali Bantu studies is striking. Studies focused on 
the Dadaab or Kakuma camps will at least mention the minority group and might devote a short 
section to them (Crisp 1999, Jansen 2008, Grayson-Courtemanche, IFC 2018, Ikanda 2018). 
Considering the fact that Somali Bantus constitute a very significant portion of the population 
of these refugee camps (Menkhaus 2017), their marginalization in the literature is puzzling. In 
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Nairobi, the numbers of Somali Bantu are much smaller, and publications on urban refugees 
generally make no mention of Somali Bantu at all (e.g. Campbell 2006, NRC 2017, Im et al 






I was in Nairobi from January 2019 until March 2020, and during that entire time I was 
interacting with the Somali Bantu community. EMM asked me to conduct the needs assessment 
at the end of January, shortly after I had reconnected with some Somali Bantu contacts I had 
made in Fall 2017. I approached the Somali Bantu community in February, and in March the 
community organized a townhall meeting and endorsed the research project. In April and May I 
finalized the research proposal and designed the interview questions. The IRB application was 
submitted in early June and approved at the end of July. Data collection took place in August 
and September, and data analysis was completed in October and November. The report was 
written in early December and the presentation to the client took place in mid-December 2019. 
In January 2020, I unsuccessfully attempted to organize a community event to 
disseminate the findings. Instead, I shared the information with several key contact in the 
community. That month, I also was invited to a meeting with a group of Somali elders who 
identified as community leaders for the entire Kenyan Somali Bantu community. They were 
based in the refugee camps but had come to Nairobi for a short visit. I was able to share some 
of my findings and discuss some ideas for future collaboration.   
Although systematic data collection for the thesis took place during the months of 
August and September, this data is placed within the wider context of interacting with the 
Somali Bantu community over a timeframe of 13 months. This contextual information aided in 
analysis, making it possible to verify some of the data and identify limitations.  
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Research Population and Sampling Methods 
Somali Bantu refugees in Nairobi constitute a hidden population, a term that 
“euphemistically refers to those who are disadvantaged and disenfranchised: the homeless and 
transient, chronically mentally ill, high school dropouts, criminal offenders, prostitutes, juvenile 
delinquents, gang members, runaways, and other street people” (Lambert & Wiebel 1990). 
Many Somali Bantus do not have the legal documents authorizing them to live in Nairobi, so 
they rarely seek out services from the government or nongovernmental organizations. They 
also try to avoid confrontations with the police by blending in and staying out of sight. Because 
of their comparatively low numbers and their social and economic disenfranchisement, Somali 
Bantus in Nairobi don’t have social spaces that work as focal points for the community. 
Furthermore, my initial contacts assured me that while they had “many friends” who were 
Somali Bantu, there was no community organization or leadership in the city.  
Bernard (2011) describes purposive sampling and respondent-driven sampling as 
methods often used to research hard-to-reach populations. In respondent-driven sampling 
(RDS), the research finds a few initial informants who act as ‘seeds’ by recommending or 
referring people from their social networks for additional interviews. These may in turn refer 
their contacts, creating ‘waves’ of informants until the desired number of interviews is 
achieved. Purposive sampling uses various methods of finding study participants, including 
announcements or presentations as community meetings and selecting participants from 
personal social networks. However, study participants are selected based on pre-defined 
criteria, much like in quota sampling. For this study, a combination of RDS and purposive 
sampling was used. I initially presented the research project to three young men in the 
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community who were reportedly well-connected. These three in turn invited members of their 
social networks to a townhall meeting, which was attended by over 60 men and women. During 
the townhall meeting, I made a presentation and announced the need for study participants. 
Attendants were then given the opportunity to volunteer for participation in an interview. 
During data collection, these volunteers were contacted first, but also asked to refer additional 
contacts from their social networks. This method gave me enough potential participants that I 
was able to select people purposely based on pre-defined criteria. Based on the information 
regarding Somali Bantus in the literature, I decided to include roughly equal numbers of 
participants from ex-slave communities along the Juba river and from indigenous communities 
along the Shabelle river. For one, I assumed that the difference in origin might result in 
differences of social and cultural capital. But I also wanted to explore whether the two groups 
actually formed a single community and how they perceived their differences and similarities. I 
also decided to include roughly equal numbers of both men and women in the study to make 
sure I didn’t miss out on gendered perspectives of the situation of Somali refugees. In addition, 
I hoped to include a range of age groups and family status, but because of the lack of 
demographic data I didn’t know if all groups would be sufficiently represented in the 
community. During the course of data collection, I slightly adjusted my participant criteria 
based on the information I was gathering to include participants from a more specific 
subgroups inside Somalia, as well as from different migrant backgrounds (undocumented, camp 
refugee, urban refugee).   
In all, I conducted 20 interviews with Somali Bantu refugees, 9 men and 11 women. Of 
these, 5 were from ex-slave communities along the Juba river, 8 from distinct communities 
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along the Shabelle river, and 7 from Bantu segments of Somali clans. Six had come to Nairobi 
from the Kakuma refugee camps, 2 from the Dadaab camps, and the remaining 12 had arrived 
through various routes without registering as refugees in Kenya. 
While my sampling methods resulted in a diverse sample of interview participants, they 
did have several significant limitations. For one, all my interview participants lived in Eastleigh. 
In fact, many of them never left Eastleigh and didn’t know anybody outside of the 
neighborhood. They were under the impression that most if not all Somali Bantu in Nairobi live 
in Eastleigh. However, after completing the community interviews, I was told of Somali Bantu 
refugees in Kangemi and in Dandora, two slums in Nairobi. Eastleigh is a major hub for ethnic 
Somalis in Kenya, and Somalis Bantus living there are somewhat integrated into the larger 
Somali community. I assume that Somali Bantus in other parts of Nairobi are more integrated 
into the Kenyan community they live in and not much connected to ethnic Somalis. In omitting 
these Somali Bantus from my study, I might have missed important needs within the 
community, as well as significant assets they might be able to contribute. 
 Secondly, my sample did not include any Somali Bantus with direct family members in 
the USA. My contacts explained that Somali Bantus were forced to look for work in Nairobi if 
they didn’t receive any remittances from family members abroad. But I later discovered that a 
number of Somali Bantus come to Nairobi because of their US relatives. I met several young 
women who were able to live in nicer neighborhoods outside of Eastleigh because their US-
based husbands paid for their housing. I also met Somali Bantus who were engaged in business 
ventures on behalf of relatives abroad. Their situation was significantly different from many of 
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my interview participants, and a follow-up study might focus on their role within the Somali 
Bantu community. 
In addition to the 20 community interviews, I included 6 interviews with service 
providers in my study. I wanted to understand what services were available to urban refugees 
in Nairobi, and learn about the experiences service providers had made with Somali Bantu 
clients. To identify service providers, I conducted an internet search of nongovernmental 
organizations serving refugees in Nairobi. I decided to not include the UNHCR or the Kenyan 
government in my study because I knew from past experiences that these institutions would be 
very difficult to access. While interviewing service providers, I wasn’t exactly ‘studying up’ since 
my status as a Western expatriate conferred significant privilege in the world of humanitarian 
agencies, but I did face a very different set of barriers in identifying and recruiting interview 
participants. Even though the number of refugee service providers in Nairobi is fairly limited, I 
ended up using a snowball sampling technique in which interview participants provided me 
with recommendations and contact details for other organizations. I ended up with a 
convenience sample of 6 interview participants, all Kenyan nationals, who worked on staff for 
several different NGOs. This is by no means a representative sample of all the service providers 
working with refugees in Nairobi, but it did several important case studies as well as added 
perspective on the community interviews.   
Data Collection and Analysis 
While the majority of my data came from semi-structured interviews, participant 
observation played an important role, as well. My ability to participate in the Somali Bantu 
community was very limited and mainly consisted of short visits of homes and workplaces. 
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Most community interviews were conducted in the homes of the participants and I so was able 
to observe the living conditions of more than a dozen different community members. My prior 
working knowledge of Eastleigh provided much background information to put these 
observations into context. 
In the same way, I was not really able to participate in the work of service providers, but 
the visits to a number of NGOs enabled me to experience some of the access barriers faced by 
refugee clients. I was also allowed to participate in a food distribution event conducted by one 
organization to observe the interaction between refugees and staff. 
The 20 community interviews and 6 service provider interviews were each about 45-60 
minutes long. Each interview was audio-recorded and subsequently transcribed. Community 
members were interviewed in their homes or in the homes of another community member 
based on their preference. This meant that some interviews were interrupted by family 
members or neighbors, and in a few cases family member were present throughout the 
interview. In each case, privacy and confidentiality concerns were explained and the participant 
was given the choice to conduct the interview privately or to have others present. Since most 
interview participants were illiterate and there were cultural reservations regarding written 
consent forms, informed consent was given verbally. In each case I made sure that there was 
opportunity to voice concerns and ask questions.  
The case was very different with service provider interviews. The participants were 
highly educated and accustomed to the protocols of humanitarian work. Each participant 
received a consent form and gave informed consent in writing prior to the interview. The 
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interviews all took place at the workplace of the participants, either in their personal office or in 
a private meeting room.  
To ensure data confidentiality, the audio recordings and written transcripts were stored 
on an encrypted computer. After transcription, audio files were destroyed and the written 
transcripts were anonymized by removing names and other personal information. Files were 
stored using a numbered system and pseudonyms were used in the deliverables. Only one of 
the interview participants voiced concerns regarding the content of the interview and seemed 
guarded regarding the information they were willing to give. For this participant, some 
questions were omitted to ensure their confidentiality and their comfort during the interview. 
The field notes and interview transcripts were analyzed qualitatively using MAXQDA. 
Notes and interviews were coded based on a code list that was based on the research questions 
and refined during the coding process. The codes were used to identify and analyze patterns 
and themes. Field notes, community interviews, and service provider interviews were 
compared to triangulate the data, and analysis was informed and aided by data from the 
existing literature and by my prior experiences of working in Eastleigh and interacting with 






The needs assessment of the Somali Bantu community in Nairobi consisted of two main 
questions: (1) What are the needs or challenges faced by Somali Bantu refugees living in 
Nairobi? And: (2) What are the existing services provided by NGOs as well as the assets and 
opportunities found within the Somali Bantu community? However, these questions are based 
on an understanding of who the Somali Bantu refugees in Nairobi are and what their 
community looks like. The underlying assumptions are that there are refugees in Nairobi 
identifying as Somali Bantus and that they form a community. These assumptions were based 
on initial contacts with Somali Bantus in Nairobi, but a lack of existing data meant that they had 
to be confirmed during the course of the study. 
Identifying as Somali Bantu 
Based on the literature, I knew that ‘Somali Bantu’ was a term given to a certain group 
of people in the refugee camps during the 1990s, and that these people subsequently 
constructed an ethnic identity around this term. The people first called Somali Bantu were from 
the lower Juba river, had retained memories of ancestral identities in East Africa, and were 
experiencing racial discrimination based on certain physical features, primarily the texture of 
their hair and the shape of their faces and noses. Within Somalia, they had been called a 
number of derogatory names, including addoon (‘slave’), jareer (‘hard-hair’), and ‘African’. 
However, these racialized categories were also applied to groups of people who did not come 
from the Juba river and did not have any memories of Bantu ancestry. The category of jareer 
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covered a significant percentage of the population of southern Somalia, including distinct 
groups along the Shabelle river and lineages of Somali clans. In the refugee camps and the US 
diaspora, most people who fell into the jareer category were called Somali Bantu, but I did not 
know to what extent people in Nairobi used the term or perceived themselves to be part of a 
common ethnic group. 
By limiting the study population to ‘Somali Bantu’, I had already introduced a certain 
bias to the question. However, when my initial contacts organized the community townhall 
meeting, I was surprised at the diversity of attendees. Some were the ‘stereotypical’ Somali 
Bantus from the Juba river, but many were from Mogadishu or other cities in southern Somalia. 
At one point during the meeting, a young Somali man entered the room, trying to find out what 
was going on and whether he could join. He was quickly ushered out again and told that this 
was a meeting for ‘Somali Bantu’ only. 
The 20 interview participants all identified as Somali Bantu in order to participate in the 
study, but when asked about their origins in Somalia, they were able to name a variety of sub-
groups. Several participants claimed membership in one of the distinct indigenous farming 
communities along the Shabelle river, the Shiidle, Makanne, and Shabelle. Their mother tongue 
was standard Somali (Maxaa Tiri), and many had grown up in the cities of Mogadishu or 
Beletweyne. Other interview participants claimed membership in a Somali clan, specifically the 
Geledi, the Bimaal and the Ajuraan. Some of them spoke standard Somali as their mother 
tongue, while others spoke a closely related Somali language called Maay. Finally, several 
participants came from the Juba river and identified either simply as Somali Bantu, or as a 
member of their ancestral group, Mayao and Mushunguli. The Mushunguli still speak their 
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ancestral Bantu language Kizigula but usually speak Maay as a local trade language, while the 
Mayao and other Juba river groups speak a dialect of Maay as their mother tongue.  
Interview participants confirmed that both jareer and Somali Bantu are racialized terms 
and that they are generally interchangeable. As one man explained: 
In Somalia they judge you by your physical features and we are recognized as 
Jareerweyne [jareer nation] or Somali Bantu. 
 
One man from the Shabelle river acknowledged that some people reject the term ‘Somali 
Bantu’, “but,” he added “I don’t care.” When asked about the different subgroups, especially 
about those from Shabelle vs those from Juba, participants generally emphasized the unity of 
all Somali Bantu: 
We are all the same since we all share the name of Somali Bantu … Everyone who is 
Somali Bantu can marry each other. 
 
This was in marked contrast to the distinction participants made between Somali Bantus and 
ethnic Somalis (sometimes called Somali Somali as a way of distinguishing the groups). Even 
those participants who were members of a Somali clan were emphatic about the difference 
between the two groups. Many complained about discrimination from ethnic Somalis and 
unequal opportunities. One woman summed up: 
As Somali Bantu and Somali Somali we are not the same. We are not treated equally. 
 
These findings confirmed the published information; Somali Bantu refugees view 
themselves as a distinct ethnic group separate from other Somalis. Despite the variety of 
subgroups, geographic origin, and linguistic diversity, the experience of racialized discrimination 
and marginalization has resulted in a common identity. It is possible, of course, that the feeling 
of unity among members of different Somali Bantu groups stems primarily from the fact that 
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interview participants lived as refugees in Kenya rather than within their communities in 
southern Somalia.1 The number of Somali Bantus in Nairobi is most likely to low for subgroups 
to form their own support networks, forcing the different groups to cooperate more.  
Coming to Nairobi 
When presenting my study to the community, I had not specified that I was only 
researching refugees. For one, I knew that all Somali Bantu in Nairobi were either first or 
second generation immigrants from Somalia, and that the overall insecurity and instability in 
Somalia had led the Kenyan government and the UNHCR to grant prima facie refugee status to 
asylum seekers from Somalia. That meant that an asylum seeker from Somalia did not have to 
prove persecution on an individual level in order to be accepted as a refugee in Kenya.  
But I also knew that many migrants from Somalia had never experienced a functioning 
government and thus had little understanding of the importance of legal categories such as 
‘citizen’, ‘immigrant’, or ‘refugee.’ Thus, interview participants might refer to themselves (and 
be referred to by others) as refugees regardless of their legal status in the country, and 
decisions to change one’s status seldom follow the rationale of those who created these 
categories. As a result, I interviewed a number of people who were not legally ‘refugees.’  
Participants shared a number of different reasons for leaving Somalia. Some 
experienced general insecurity and threats of violence, as this man recounted: 
I did not have any security. When I woke up in the morning and went to work, I met a lot 
of risks, like bombs exploding. Maybe you want to pass a safe road, then you find the 
 
1 This common identity was not only expressed by interview participants but also observed in social interactions 
before and during data collection. I discovered a number of friendships between members of different subgroups, 
including people who claimed to dislike interacting with ethnic Somalis. 
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police there, telling you: You can’t pass here. So you choose a different road and might 
meet robbers there. 
 
Others told stories of individual persecution or violence: 
My husband was killed by al-Shabaab when I was three months pregnant. I gave birth 
there, then I came to Nairobi. I came by bus, the journey took almost one and a half 
months. I escaped in fear and came to Nairobi looking for safety. 
 
Not all participants left Somalia because of insecurity. Some came to Nairobi looking for better 
education or work opportunities.  
My husband didn’t have a job in Somalia, so he decided to come here. I came with him. 
 
Accompanying or following family members was given by a number of people as the main 
reason they left Somalia. One woman explained: 
At some point, my husband left and I didn’t know where he was. After some months I 
heard he was in Nairobi, so I came together with another family to look for him. 
 
A number of participants came to Kenya as children with family members and grew up 
in the refugee camps. One young man was even born in the camps as a second-generation 
refugee. Several young women working in the household of another family in Somalia and 
traveled along when their employers moved. In some cases it was hard to distinguish between 
a familial and a working relationship: 
My parents died and I was staying with neighbors. When they moved here, I came along 
… The family I came with left. After that, I was living with another family… I was young, 
about 12 years old. I knew nothing about the world. That family mistreated me, but I 
had what I needed. 
 
Just as the reasons for leaving Somalia varied, so did the routes the refugees took to get 
to Nairobi. Overall, Somali Bantus from the Juba river tended to arrive in Kenya, register as 
refugees, and live in one of the refugee camps for some time. One young woman who grew up 
in Kakuma even preferred life in the camp to that in Nairobi because of her fear of the police, 
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but generally, participants described Kakuma and Dadaab camps as very harsh and difficult 
places.  
There is scorching sun, shortage of water, shortage of food, lack of security. There was a 
time when the host community came, even during daytime, and raped the girls. That’s 
why most people hate to live in the refugee camp. 
 
Lack of security and specifically sexual violence was mentioned by several people. Lack of food 
was also a concern expressed by a number of people and listed as one of the main reasons for 
moving to Nairobi. 
The ration card they give us is not enough for the family. That’s why I came here in 
order to feed them. 
 
Interviews with service providers confirmed that food rations in the refugee camps had 
been cut in the last five years due to funding shortages, and the variety of food had been 
reduced as well. Especially families with many children complained that the food they received 
in the camp would not last for the whole month. Other than the food refugees receive for free 
through their ration cards, food in Kakuma refugee camp is significantly more expensive than in 
urban centers in Kenya. Many refugees are forced to find additional sources of income to 
supplement their rations. Finding work in Nairobi is the primary reason refugees leave the 
camps.  
I was born in Dadaab and I grew up there. I went to school there. The main problem I 
see is a lack of jobs. When I experienced that there is no job, I decided to come to 
Nairobi, both for myself and for my family … The little amount of money I get I send to 
my family. 
 
Some people specifically came to Nairobi because they needed the income to support 
family members who remained in the camps. Others came, like the young man in the previous 
quote, because they had finished school and were becoming adults. Social expectations on 
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them included getting married and starting their own household, as well as supporting aging 
parents or younger siblings. Being idle as a young man can feel like failure. 
There, if you graduate from school, you can’t find work … All my friends who graduated 
with me are just sitting at home. We’re eating the food but we don’t work. There is no 
perspective. I ran away from those things. That’s why I came here. 
 
There, my father sees me every day, not working. Every day he’ll ask: What did you get? 
But you’re just sitting at home. You have to change that behavior. Whether you’re 
working or not, your father expects you to contribute. But he sees you sitting there, not 
going anywhere. So, I had to change that. I had to look for a job. 
 
With Somali Bantus arriving in Kenya ever since the early 1990s, there is now a whole 
generation who has grown up in the camps. Increasingly, young men and women choose to 
leave the camp to find jobs. One woman I talked to claimed she was the first to come to Nairobi 
from Kakuma, but since then word has spread and more are coming every year. 
The movement from the camps to Nairobi is not a one-way trip, however. Shortly after I 
had finished data collection, word spread within the community that the UNHCR was 
conducting a ‘verification exercise’ in Kakuma. Any refugee who was not present would be 
listed as inactive, meaning their ration cards would be invalid and their resettlement cases 
would be paused. To prevent that from happening, all the research participants who were still 
registered in Kakuma left Nairobi on a perilous two-day bus ride to be back with their families 
when the camp authorities would come to their house to verify everybody’s identity. The 
exercise took weeks to complete; afterwards, the refugees slowly made their way back to 
Nairobi. 
In addition, there are some Somali Bantus who fail in Nairobi. Either they are unable to 
make enough money to cover the higher living expenses in the city or they are deterred by the 
level of police harassment they experience in the city. They either find a way to return to the 
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camp themselves, or they might be deported there by the police. 
Many refugees from urban centers in Somalia avoided the refugee camps altogether. 
While many of the Somali Bantu from agricultural villages along the Juba river had almost no 
previous experience of government services or modern amenities found it easier to adjust to 
the simple life in the refugee camp, those from cities such as Mogadishu or Merka were used to 
a very different lifestyle and had little interest in being a ‘refugee’. These research participants 
had set out from Somalia planning to move to an urban center in Kenya in order to find safety, 
education, and work. Some managed to avoid the refugee regime altogether and travelled 
directly to Nairobi, others spent a few days or months in Dadaab. 
My plan had been to come directly to Nairobi, but there is no way to avoid Dadaab, so I 
stayed there for 2 months. 
 
Several participants had lived in other Kenyan cities before coming to Nairobi, and some 
had even been registered as refugees in neighboring countries like Ethiopia or Uganda. One 
woman explained that she had an ongoing resettlement case in another country, but life there 
had become too difficult so she decided to move to Nairobi. Another woman announced that 
she was preparing for a short trip back to Mogadishu to settle a family dispute there. 
Afterwards, she intended to return to Nairobi. Overall, Somali Bantus who avoided the camps 
seemed more mobile and had more complex migration routes.2 
Intersecting Vulnerabilities 
As I visited the homes of different research participants, I noticed a variety of 
 
2 For some, this increased mobility seemed to stem from personal resources (including intangible resources such as 
business experience or education). Others traveled as dependents of family members or employers and had little 
control over their migration routes. 
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socioeconomic situations. Some Somali Bantu shared a small room, even a single mattress, with 
several other people, while others had managed to rent several rooms and even featured a TV 
or a sofa in their living room. Overall, all the interview participants were experiencing some 
level of poverty, and many were clearly struggling to meet basic needs. However, I had 
previously experienced similar levels of poverty among other refugees in Nairobi and even 
among many Kenyans. 
Somali Bantus also faced a number of structural barriers to participating in Kenyan 
society. Refugee laws made it impossible for many to live in Nairobi legally or to find formal 
employment. In addition, a lack of cultural capital meant that Somali Bantus were confined to a 
small niche within the Kenyan economy. Yet these were challenges faced by other refugees as 
well. As I talked with Kenyan service providers about the situation of the Somali Bantu, one 
(usually unspoken) questions was often: Why should this particular group of people deserve our 
special attention? 
Both among Kenyan nationals and among Somali refugees, there is much more variation 
in socioeconomic status than among Somali Bantu refugees. Among Kenyans, of course, there is 
the whole range from abject poverty to incredible wealth. Wealth and power are not shared 
equally among different ethnic groups in Kenya, and there are some communities that are very 
much marginalized and impoverished as a whole, but overall many Kenyans have within their 
extended social networks access to some degree of wealth and power. The same is true, to a 
lesser extent, for Somali refugees. While, as refugees, they face barriers or documentation and 
stigma, many Somali refugees benefit from social networks to Kenyan Somalis, to the global 
Somali diaspora, or to the elites in Somalia. While there are Somali refugees who are just as 
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poor as most Somali Bantus, there are also many who have established themselves in Nairobi as 
successful businesspeople. Furthermore, in Kenya most structural barriers can be overcome 
with the help of financial resources, and wealthy Somali refugees can live quite comfortably in 
Nairobi, accessing services and resources and not worrying about police harassment or 
deportation. 
Somali Bantus don’t have that same degree of variation within their community, and 
thus they don’t have the community resources to support each other in the way Somalis do. 
One Somali Bantu woman described the difference in the following way: 
Somalis have money and houses. They assist one another. If they see their brothers are 
suffering, they will assist them. They will create jobs for them. But the Somali Bantu 
people have nothing at all, so how can they assist each other? If your brother sees you 
suffering, he can’t do anything for you other than praying for God to help you! That’s 
the difference. Those people, they have been here for a long time and they have 
buildings, and they help one another. 
 
This perspective was echoed by a number of other participants. One young man added that 
because there are ethnic Somalis in government positions both in Somalia and in Kenya, ethnic 
Somalis benefit from government policies and from clan connections and thus have access to 
better education, better jobs, and better legal documentation. 
As mentioned in Chapter 2, clan connections are a very important resource among 
ethnic Somalis. Based on customary law (xeer), clan members have contractual obligations 
towards each other that include many different forms of support. Among refugees in Nairobi, 
clan connections are used to find jobs and housing, to pay medical bills and police fines, and to 
find sponsors for education, migration, and business ventures. Since clans number many 
thousands of people bound together by common descent, ethnic Somalis wield significant 
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amounts of social capital and are likely to find an existing support system in many places across 
the world. 
While Somali Bantus support each other as well, they don’t have the same clearly 
defined contractual obligations toward each other, and they don’t have the extended clan 
networks to draw on. This difference was mentioned by several research participants as an 
important factor in success. 
The Somali Bantu refugees in Nairobi are poor, and they don’t have much support. 
Other Somalis have their brothers who help each other, while Somali Bantus don’t assist 
each other. For Somalis, they like to assist each other. Those who go abroad – if one of 
them goes out of the country, they assist each other. Not just the same family, but as 
long as they are the same clan, they assist each other. But Somali Bantus don’t assist 
each other. That’s the biggest problem. 
 
Avoiding the Authorities 
One of the NGO interviews participants was a protection officer who could explain the 
legal situation of refugees in Nairobi in detail. According to him, the biggest problem that 
refugees in the city face is a lack of ID documents. Not having the right documentation prevents 
refugees from accessing the formal job market, as well as a number of financial and other 
services. More importantly, though, a lack of proper documentation creates vulnerability that is 
exploited by the Kenyan police. 
This perception was confirmed by my Somali Bantu interview participants. Lack of ID 
documents was identified as one of the biggest problems by 50% of the participants, and police 
harassment by 45%.  
Police Harassment 
Many Kenyans imagine Eastleigh as a haven for Somali terrorists and pirates, and a 
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number of Western countries have issued travel warnings specifically for this neighborhood. Yet 
none of the Somali Bantu refugees I spoke with mentioned terrorists as a problem, and only 
one mentioned robbers in Eastleigh. Instead, the biggest threat to most interview participants 
was clearly the police. As one man put it: “Here in Eastleigh, we don’t really have robbers, other 
than the police.” 
Some refugees understand that the Kenyan police have legitimate reasons to arrest 
them, as they don’t have legal authorization to be in Nairobi. One young woman from Kakuma 
explained:  
Your documents show you’re a refugee. You’re here without authority. You’re a 
criminal, you’ll be arrested. 
 
But as there are compelling reasons for these people to be in Nairobi regardless, their only 
hope is to “convince them to understand your situation and release you.” One woman 
recounted how she was able to obtain the proper documents and since then has not had any 
problems with the police, although she is still afraid of them.  
Other refugees, however, describe police arrests as arbitrary and unjustified. Several 
interview participants claimed that they had been arrested despite having proper 
documentation. In one case, a police officer even destroyed a document presented by a 
refugee. The only identification that really provides protection from the police is the Kenyan 
national ID. This perception was confirmed by the protection officer I spoke with. According to 
him, many police officers are confused by the various identification documents carried by 
refugees, some of which are little more than a piece of paper. Others, however, don’t care 
about the legal status of refugees at all, they simply want to extort money. Refugees regularly 
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described interactions with police as “they ask you for money,” or “they will take all your 
money.” 
Arrests by the police are a very common occurrence. Some estimate that they are 
arrested about once a month, others about every other week. One man summarized: “If you’re 
not arrested today or tomorrow, you’ll be arrested the next day.” The only way to avoid arrests 
is to avoid the police completely. But Eastleigh has a significant police presence during the day, 
and even more so at night. Going out for lunch, for prayers at the mosque, or even just to buy 
something at the grocery store always carries the risk of being ‘caught’ by the police. Many 
refugees avoid going outside as much as possible, especially at night. One man lamented “We 
can’t see our friends at night because we’re afraid of the police.” 
Even though refugees are often ‘arrested', they are rarely taken to the police station, 
and nobody I talked with had ever been charged in court. In most cases, those who are stopped 
by the police just pay the required bribe immediately, or negotiate their release on the way to 
the station. One man described the process:  
If they catch you, they say: ‘Give us money.’ If they take you to their car, the demands 
increase. Now it’s double the money. If you go all the way to the station, it again 
doubles. You better pay something when they first arrest you, instead of waiting until 
you’re at the station. 
 
Only two men described actually being taken to Pangani police station because they didn’t have 
any money on them. One met some friends at the station who were able to pay something on 
his behalf to get him released. The other was detained for two days. “If you don’t have any 
money, you’re stuck,” he explained. The one time I had the opportunity to personally observe 
the jail at Pangani police station, I encountered about 50 refugees there who were all waiting to 
be ransomed by relatives. 
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Should a refugee be taken to court, there are two possible charges. If they are not 
registered as a refugee or an asylum seeker in Kenya, they will be charged with being in the 
country illegally. In theory, a conviction would result in deportation. In practice, however, 
refugees are able to claim asylum in court and will usually be released to the Refugee Affairs 
Secretariat. If, on the other hand, they are registered in one of the refugee camps, they will be 
charged with ‘residing outside designated areas.’ But in practice this is not seen as a serious 
offense and will usually just result in being sent back to the camp. Instead of going through the 
trouble of a trial, the government often just detains people and transports them back to the 
camp directly. 
RAS and UNHCR 
The process of becoming a recognized refugee in Kenya is a long and complicated one. 
When a person arrives in Kenya, they are supposed to present themselves to the authorities 
and claim asylum. In Nairobi, this is done at the Refugee Affairs Secretariat in Shauri Moyo, not 
far from Eastleigh. At that point they are registered as an asylum seeker, and they will be given 
two documents. One is the government Proof of Registration, which is also called the Manifest. 
The other one is an asylum seeker’s pass, valid for 6 months, which will include a date for an 
interview appointment. Once a person is registered as an asylum seeker, they enter into the 
refugee status determination process, which by law should take about 3 months and concludes 
with an interview. After the interview, the asylum seeker is given another appointment to 
collect the decision. The case then goes to the refugee eligibility panel, and from there to the 
commissioner to sign the documents. After that, the asylum seeker can collect their decision. If 
they are approved as a refugee, they are given a recognition letter and told to apply for a 
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refugee ID. Once they have applied, they are given a waiting slip, which they use to collect the 
ID. Ideally, any refugee would be in possession of a recognition letter and a refugee ID card. 
The entire process is handled by the Refugee Affairs Secretariat (RAS), a branch of the 
Kenyan government. However, RAS was only formed in 2016, before that, the UNHCR was 
responsible for refugee status determination, and instead of a Recognition Letter from the 
Kenyan government, refugees received a document from the UNHCR called a Mandate. As a 
result, some refugees still have a Mandate, while others have the Recognition Letter. In 
addition, the transition period from UNHCR to RAS was not a smooth one, and for about two 
years both refugees and NGOs were often confused as to the proper process of registration and 
status determination. In March 2018, RAS stopped registering refugees in order to live in 
Nairobi. Even before that time, many refugees who registered in Nairobi were transferred to 
the Kakuma or Dadaab refugee camps as refugees were discouraged from living in Nairobi. 
Since March 2018, however, all asylum seekers are registered to reside in the camps, regardless 
of their situation. Their Proof of Registration document lists their place of residence as either 
Dadaab or Kakuma, and they are issued a Movement Pass to travel to that location within 10 
days of their registration. Those who are unable or unwilling to live in the refugee camps can 
appeal to an exemption panel at the RAS, but that panel has a huge backlog of cases to 
consider, with over 6,000 pending cases. Until an asylum seeker is given an exemption to live in 
Nairobi, they live in Nairobi without authorization and their status determination process in the 
camps cannot be completed. 
In practice, the process of becoming a refugee in Kenya and receiving all the necessary 
documentation is not as straightforward as described above. Instead of being completed in the 
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envisioned three months, the refugee status determination takes about two years. As the 
asylum seeker’s pass is only valid for six months, asylum seekers have to return to RAS every six 
months to get it renewed.  
Additionally, even the initial registration can be quite difficult. A Somali refugee I 
interviewed separately from this project told me that when he first arrived at RAS in Shauri 
Moyo to claim asylum, the computer systems were down and he was given a piece of paper 
with an appointment to return another day. By the time I talked to him, he had gone to 11 
different appointments and was still not registered as an asylum seeker! 
Finally, even after a refugee has been given a Recognition Letter and has applied for 
their refugee card, it can take a long time to be processed. The refugee card is only valid for a 
few years, after that it has to be renewed. 
As a result of all this, some refugees living in Nairobi have not been registered at all and 
are in the country undocumented. Others have asylum seeker’s passes that indicate their 
residence in one of the camps, and so they are living in Nairobi without authorization. Some 
refugees have asylum seeker’s passes that are expired and were not renewed, others have 
expired refugee cards, or just a waiting slip indicating that they have applied for a card. 
Additionally, many refugees are not used to written documents and live in very unstable 
environments, resulting in documents getting dirty, torn, lost, or stolen.  
Of the Somali Bantu refugees I interviewed, several were not registered in Kenya. One of 
them had entered the country in a tourist visa which was long expired. Another one had 
previously lived in Uganda and was registered as a refugee there. A third one had tried to 
register at Shauri Moyo but was denied entrance. About half of my interview participants were 
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registered as refugees in Kakuma or Dadaab, and held different forms of documentation from 
there. One man who had been in Kakuma for over 10 years still had not received his refugee 
card, and the waiting slip had been torn up by a police officer during one of many arrests. 
Another had his documents stolen from his room several months before the interview. Only 
three people told me they were registered to live in Nairobi, and just one of them was in 
possession of a refugee card for Nairobi, which afforded her the highest degree of protection 
possible for a refugee. 
The worst consequence of not having the proper documentation is increased 
vulnerability in the face of police harassment. But a lack of documentation has far-reaching 
effect in many areas of life. It makes it much harder for refugees to acquire a SIM card for their 
phones or to open an mPesa3 account. In some cases, it prevents access to services such as 
education or healthcare. Perhaps most importantly, a lack of documentation make formal 
employment impossible.  
To find work in the formal job market in Kenya, an employee needs to provide their 
employer with their KRA pin number for income tax. However, the Kenya Revenue Authority 
only issues pin numbers to foreigners who hold a valid work permit. In theory, a refugee can 
apply for a work permit, a process that takes about six months. In practice, it is almost 
impossible for refugees to receive work permits in Kenya, and most applications end in a ‘no 
merit’ decision. The main reason for this is that Kenya has fairly high requirements for 
foreigners applying for a work permit. The applicant has to demonstrate that they have 
 
3 mPesa is a very popular mobile money transfer system operated by Kenya’s largest phone network provider, 
Safaricom. In addition to being the vehicle for domestic remittances between city and camp, mPesa is also the 
primary means of paying government fees and fines. 
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‘exceptional skills’ which their employer was unable to find locally, and that they will pass on 
those skills to a Kenyan employee. The vast majority of refugees are poorly educated and can’t 
offer any ‘exceptional skills’. Those who grew up in the refugee camps have received a Kenyan 
education and thus have no possibility of acquiring skills not available to other Kenyans.  
In some cases, refugees are hired as translators as they might be able to speak a 
language not found in Kenya. In the past, these refugees were most likely to successfully apply 
for a work permit. In recent years, however, even those applications have been denied, 
pointing to an unwillingness within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to grant refugees work 
permits. 
Finding Work and Keeping Jobs 
While refugees in the camps receive free food, shelter, education, and healthcare, these 
services are not available within Nairobi. The rationale behind this is that only refugees who can 
support themselves should live in urban areas of Kenya. In some cases, where refugees can 
demonstrate that they are not safe in the camps or that they have to live in Nairobi in order to 
access better healthcare, the UNHCR will facilitate a move to Nairobi and provide initial cash 
support, intended to enable refugees to set up a household and pay the first three months of 
rent. After that, urban refugees are expected to earn their own income, although there are 
some NGOs in Nairobi who offer support to vulnerable refugees. 
As a result, one of the biggest needs of refugees in Nairobi is to find a source of income 
that will at least cover the cost of food and housing. A small number of urban refugees receive 
remittances from family members in the diaspora. In some cases, these remittances are 
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sufficient to cover all their expenses and even enable them to pursue further education. In 
most cases, however, remittances only supplement other sources of income. 
Among the Somali Bantus I interviewed, very few had family members in the US, and 
even those who did complained that they did not receive any support from them. In fact, in 
many cases Somali Bantus decided to move to Nairobi because they did not receive any 
remittances. One of the main motivations to live in the city is to find work that will provide a 
sufficient income. Consequently, of the 20 Interview participants, over 80%  were very 
concerned about finding work, and about 50% listed a lack of jobs as one of the biggest 
problems in Nairobi. Many Somali Bantus were also very concerned with keeping work, and 
25% mentioned work conditions as a major problem, as well.  
Since none of the Somali Bantus I’ve encountered in Nairobi possessed the documents 
necessary for formal employment, and very few have a level of education comparable to their 
Kenyan peers, their options for work were very limited. Most of my interview participants did 
not speak English or Swahili, the two national languages of Kenya, and one person told me she 
had never been to school at all. As a result, several interview participants did not have any 
work, and several others worked as casual laborers, looking for new opportunities every day. 
Young Somali Bantu women most often sought employment as domestic workers, while more 
experienced women were often ‘hawkers’, running a small business of selling clothes or food 
on the streets or in shopping centers. Somali Bantu men have found a wide variety of low-skill 
jobs, although the majority work as tailors. 
Female Domestic Workers 
Living and working in the household of a Somali family seems to be a common situation 
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for young Somali Bantu women inside Somalia. I’ve been told several stories were girls as young 
as 12 were in full-time employment as domestic workers. One of my initial contacts in the 
community told me about a relative who was working for a Somali family at age 12 when that 
family moved to the other side of Somalia and took the girl with her. Her mother lost all contact 
to the girl for about 20 years, by which time she had several children of her own. Two of my 
interview participants told similar stories. One was taken to Kenya at age 12 while in the 
employment of a Somali family, another was about the same age when she was taken to 
Ethiopia. Although none of the Somali Bantus I know have called these situations slavery, it is 
clear that the employers have almost total control over the lives of these girls.  
Somali Bantu women who work for Somali families usually live with their employers. 
They are given a place to sleep, and they eat from the food they prepare for the family. While it 
is not clear whether teenaged girls are also given a salary, the adult women I talked with are all 
being paid for their work. Salaries seem to range around 6,000 to 10,000 KES per month, in 
addition to food and accommodation. I’ve met two Somali Bantu women who were able to find 
domestic work only during daytime hours because they had small children to care for and were 
not able to live with their employers. But generally, I was told:  
When you are working for Somalis, they don’t allow you to stay at another place. You 
have to stay with them. 
 
Domestic workers who live with their employers usually start work very early in the morning to 
prepare breakfast. Throughout the day they will cook food, wash dishes, care for the children, 
wash clothes, run errands, etc. As one interview participant described it: “You do everything in 
the house, so your work never ends.” 
Although domestic work is common, everybody in the community seems to agree that 
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work conditions are very bad and it’s generally the worst kind of work. Interview participants 
described their employers as being very controlling and demanding, overworking their 
employees, and abusing them both verbally and physically. One person also mentioned sexual 
abuse.  
Domestic workers are struggling to maintain a social life, as their employers will give 
them very little free time and limit their phone use at work. Some girls call their friends at night 
after everybody else has gone to sleep. Others will lie to their employers that they are being 
summoned by family members, just to get out of the house and spend some time with friends. 
One Somali Bantu woman described how her employer forced her to remain in her job 
by threatening to call the police and have her arrested, should she decide to leave. But 
generally, employers seem more likely to fire domestic workers as soon as there is a conflict. 
Especially adult women who are more likely to stand up for themselves are often fired after just 
a few months or even a few days. Sometimes they are thrown out of the house in the middle of 
the night, at other times, they are not paid for the time they worked. Many domestic workers 
hold deep resentment against former employers, but also acknowledge that they don’t have 
any other options but to continue in this line of work. 
There seems to be a significant difference between women who came straight from 
Somalia and those who lived in the refugee camps. The former often moved with their 
employers at a young age and worked for the same family for many years. In their 20s, they will 
often try to leave this work, either by marrying and being supported by their husbands, or by 
finding other work as shop keepers or hawkers. The women who grew up in the refugee camps 
generally don’t start working until they reach adulthood and feel the need to support older 
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parents or younger siblings still living in the camp. They tend to send any money they earn to 
their family and not save anything for themselves. But they also tend to get fired more often, 
and have a harder time keeping a job. When out of work, they might travel back to the refugee 
camp or stay with friends in Nairobi. 
Male Employees 
While domestic workers are technically employees, their situation often resembles 
servitude or even slavery, as employers exercise enormous control over their lives. This is quite 
different for Somali Bantu men seeking work in Nairobi. While male employees also complain 
about difficult work conditions, they almost never live at their place of work, and as a result 
have significantly more freedom, but also a different set of challenges. 
Somali Bantu men seeking employment in Nairobi have more options available to them 
than women. I’ve met Somali Bantus working as janitors, shop keepers, waiters, cooks, or 
Quran teachers. Others are day laborers, looking for casual work such as loading trucks or 
helping out in a shop. The most popular option, however, seems to be work as a tailor. 
Those who are being directly employed by Somalis often complain of “discrimination”. 
This is usually described in two different ways: Verbal abuse based on their status as Somali 
Bantus, and denial of job opportunities because they are not part of the Somali clan system. 
While I have been given very few examples of verbal abuse, presumably because of the shame 
connected to those memories, interview participants talk openly about the second kind of 
discrimination. It is based on the social obligations of support within the Somali clan system. If, 
for example, a Somali business owner is asked for a job opportunity by a member of their sub-
clan, they are obligated to give preference to that person, regardless of their qualifications.  
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As a result, Somali Bantus tell of many instances where they were fired from a job 
because another Somali wanted it. In some cases, the person replacing them was clearly less 
qualified. One interview participant, a cook, even complained that he was often hired to train 
an unqualified relative of his employer, and once that person had learned enough from him for 
the job, he would be fired again. Because of this form of discrimination, most Somali Bantu 
employees are struggling to keep jobs. They might only be employed for a few weeks or a few 
months before they are replaced by somebody else. The only Somali Bantu men I’ve met who 
were in the same job for several years were all from Mogadishu. They were slightly more 
educated and had more cultural competency and language skills, and were thus more 
integrated into Somali society. 
Because of these patterns of discrimination, many Somali Bantu men prefer to work as 
tailors. Instead of being directly employed, tailors seem to work more like contractors who are 
being paid commission for their work. Tailoring usually takes place in a small workshop adjacent 
to fabrics stores in a shopping mall. Sometimes, the owner of a fabrics store sets up a sewing 
machine in a free corner of their shop. Either way, the workspace and the sewing machines are 
usually owned by a Somali businessperson. Customers buy fabrics in the store, then order them 
to be made into dresses by the tailors. Often these are extremely simple jobs that only cost 20 
shillings. The tailor get to keep half of the money, while the owner of the sewing machine and 
the workshop takes the other half. While this arrangement is financially less desirable than 
direct employment, many tailors prefer it because of the flexibility in working hours and 
especially because there is less ‘discrimination’. Many tailors complain, though, that there is a 
lack of work, and few seem to have a secure job at a specific work shop. Many tailors work as 
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casual laborers, walking around the malls and visiting their friends in the hope of getting to 
assist somebody in their work.  
Overall, many Somali Bantu men struggle with a very insecure work environment where 
they their income varies from day to day, and much time is spent on finding work. In a good 
month, the average employee might make as much as 8,000-12,000 shillings, which is barely 
enough to pay the bills in a place like Eastleigh. 
During my interviews I asked participants about the possibility of working for Kenyans. 
This was always dismissed as impossible, although the reasons given varied. One man explained 
that Kenyan employers demand proper documentation and will not accept refugees. A woman 
exclaimed that Kenyan don’t have any jobs to offer since they are poor and looking for work 
themselves. Others simply said that their lack of language skills made it impossible for them to 
interact much with Kenyans and so they were forced to work for Somalis. 
Business Owners 
Four of the interview participants ran their own businesses, rather than working for 
somebody else. Surprisingly, all four are women. In Kenya, all four would be classified as 
hawkers as they do not operate in a shop or an office, but sell their products on the street or go 
from shop to shop in the malls. As hawkers, they are unable to obtain business licenses (which 
are generally available for refugees), and are thus vulnerable to harassment from both the 
police and the Nairobi county council. In three cases, the women make and sell street food or 
beverages, which utilizes their domestic skills and requires minimal start-up capital. One made 
tea at home, then took it in thermos flasks to the malls to sell tea by the cup to shopkeepers. 
Another one made pastries at home, then also sold them to shopkeepers in the mall. A third 
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woman had set up a little stall on the side of the road close to her home where she could cook 
and sell a variety of street food. One time I passed by her shop to find a Kenyan woman from 
the nearby slum helping her peel potatoes, seemingly as a casual employee. All three women 
had school-aged children to support, and two lived without a spouse, making them the only 
breadwinner of the family. The fourth woman had a business of buying clothes wholesale and 
then selling them on the side of road. All four women had grown up in urban settings in Somalia 
and migrated to Kenya as adults, which seemed to give them the social and financial skills to 
operate their own business. 
These businesswomen spent their days in public spaces on the streets and in the malls, 
in marked contrast to the number of interview participants who told me that they tried to 
move around the neighborhood as little as possible to avoid being arrested by the police. As a 
result, the women were exposing themselves to the risks of confrontations with authorities on 
a daily basis, which could easily mean incurring significant financial losses: 
They have arrested me many times! About every other week. And if you manage to 
avoid the police, the city council will get you. They will take everything you have. They 
don’t ask for money. If you have sambusa4 or whatever you’re selling, they will take it 
away from you. They police will ask you for money and if you give it to them, they will 
release you. But the city council will take everything. They don’t care. 
 
The Nairobi city council – or more accurately, the Nairobi county council that replaced the city 
council after the implementation of the 2010 constitution – is responsible for issuing business 
permits and enforcing compliance. For those women running a food business, there was the 
additional requirement of having a health certificate. Lack of either document meant the loss of 
 
4 Sambusa is an alternative regional name for samosa, a savory pastry with Indian origins but very popular in East 
Africa. 
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the business, which could only be recovered by paying a bribe.  
Several of the interview participants mentioned having their own business as a dream 
for the future. One young woman who had a job as a domestic worker explained that with the 
right amount of starting capital, she would be able to rent a shop and start selling clothes. 
Several young men who worked as tailors talked about starting their own tailoring workshop. 
One man gave me a detailed list of all the things he would need to start a workshop, including 
the prices for each. Obviously, he had already put some thought into this dream: 
Since I am now a tailor, I would be very glad to get some support to get my own place 
and my own machine … [the machine is] 27,000. And then there is the overlock. It’s very 
expensive: 45,000. You need both of them. But the overlock you can sometimes borrow 
from your neighbors … The room is 15,000. Electricity might be 1,000 per month … If 
you own the machine and the room, you might make 2,000 in a day. 1,000 is for the 
machine and room, 1,000 you take home. 
 
Several months after I conducted the interviews, one of these young men managed to get a 
substantial cash investment from relatives in the USA and actually turned this dream into a 
reality. He rented a very small workshop and bought two sewing machines. He even managed 
to get a business permit for his workshop from the city council.  
Basic Needs: Food and Shelter 
Having a place to sleep and food to eat are the two most basic necessities. Compared to 
most other places in Kenya, both are fairly expensive in Nairobi, and for many Somali Bantus, 
finding food and shelter is a constant struggle. However, the struggles for food and shelter are 
quite different: Shelter is secured on a monthly basis by renting a room or an apartment. The 
challenge is to save up enough money throughout the month to be able to make a fairly large 
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one-time payment for the new month. Food, on the other hand, is a daily expense, especially 
for those without access to a kitchen.  
Many Somali Bantus acknowledge that those who can’t afford to pay for food or 
housing are the neediest within the community, and stabilizing them is the highest priority. 
These people fall into three categories: (1) those who can’t find a steady source of income and 
try to make ends meet every day by looking for casual work, (2) those who have been fired 
from their job and don’t have any income while they look for new work, (3) those who have 
families and their income is not sufficient to cover all their needs. 
Overall, 60% of the participants mentioned food as a problem. Some described worrying 
about whether they would have enough food for their family, others admitted not having 
enough to eat and being hungry. One young man told me: 
I don’t know if I’ll get money today and if I’ll eat or not. Yesterday, I only ate one meal. 
Today, I ate breakfast, but I don’t know whether I’ll get lunch. 
 
When people get desperate for food, they have to resort to begging from their friends or 
neighbors. But one man explained how shameful it is to have to beg: 
You might have someone coming to you saying: I have not been able to eat lunch today, 
can you help me? Imagine, you’re a grown man and you’re begging from someone your 
own age! How does that make you feel in your heart? And me, I don’t have anything to 
give that person that will satisfy him. So I give him the little I have to help him. There are 
a lot of people who are suffering. 
 
Since most Somali Bantus live in a single room which they either share with other single 
adults or with their immediate family, very few have access to a proper kitchen. In fact, single 
men often don’t have any means to prepare their own food, relying instead on buying snacks 
and street food. Women with children usually cook their own food, often with a single propane 
burner placed in a corner of their room or in the hallway outside. Water for cooking and 
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washing dishes needs to be brought in from shared bathrooms, and food is prepared on a plate 
or into a pot on the floor. As nobody can afford a refrigerator, food that can’t be stored for 
some time at room temperature has to be bought in small quantities on an almost daily basis. 
However, this way of cooking is not very different from what people are used to in the refugee 
camps or in the rural villages in Somalia.  
Domestic workers usually don’t have to worry about housing and food as they live with 
their employers and eat off of the food they prepare for them. Depending on the relationship 
with their employer, this can be challenging, as well. A young woman recounted: “They gave 
me food, but if I ate just a little bit they would complain: You’re eating too much!” 
Shelter is an even bigger struggle than food, with 75% of participants listing rent 
payments as one of the major problems of living in Nairobi. Rent prices in Eastleigh vary a lot 
based on location and the quality of the house. New apartment buildings in central Eastleigh 
will charge as much as 60,0005 or 80,000 per month for a 3-bedroom apartment, while older, 
run-down buildings on the edges of the neighborhood ask for around 10,000 for a studio or 1-
bedroom apartment, and around 5,000 for a single small room with shared bathroom facilities. 
Considering that many refugees in Eastleigh earn only around 10,000 from a steady job, paying 
rent is a struggle shared by almost all Somali Bantus. Those who don’t have a steady income 
will try to share a room: 
There are some who are living five people in one room, each paying 1,000. And even 
that 1,000, some people can’t find. 
 
 
5 All monetary amounts are given in Kenyan Shillings. The exchange rate in 2019 was approximately 100 KSH = 1 
USD, so a rent of 60,000 would translate to around $600. 
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Saving up money to pay rent at the beginning of the month is a top priority to not end 
up homeless. Especially families often have to make very hard decisions between saving money 
for rent, paying school fees for their children, or paying medical bills. One mother explained: 
My daughter has been sick for almost one week, and I have not taken her to the 
hospital. The reason is that I just can’t afford it. It’s the end of the month and the rent is 
due. I’m not earning much from my business. So she has to stay here in the room and 
wait until I find enough money. But we’re at the end of the month and I need to pay 
rent. 
 
Those who were not able to save the money needed for the rent payment face eviction, unless 
they can negotiate a payment plan with their landlord. 
Even for this month the landlady tried to lock my room, but I convinced my neighbors to 
talk to her and they told her: Please allow me to pay my rent in small installments. Now 
I’ve paid half of it and I still owe her. 
 
Threats of eviction seem to be a regular experience for many refugees. If the rent is 
overdue, the landlord will simply put a padlock on the door of the room until the rent is paid. 
Those who are unable to pay are evicted and have to look for a new place to sleep. A young 
man admitted: 
You know, even this month my room was been locked up by the landlord because I 
didn’t manage to pay the rent … Sometimes I sleep in the mosque, and sometimes I 
sleep with my friends when the landlord has locked my own room because of the 
payment of the rent. 
 
For single men or women, spending a few nights with friends doesn’t seem to be a big problem, 
although several participants emphasized the insecurity of such an arrangement: 
I don’t have my own place; I am staying with other people. Tomorrow they might tell me 
to leave. Then I’ll have to find a new family to host me. 
 
Families have far fewer options than singles when they are evicted. Although one of the 
participants told me that her whole family was staying with other people because they couldn’t 
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afford a place of their own, there are few community members able to host a family. One man 
explained that paying rent was a bigger challenge for him now that he was married and had 
children, because he wouldn’t be able to stay with friends if he was evicted: “It’s harder for a 
family because they can’t find a place to sleep.” 
Again, the situation is slightly different for domestic workers who live with their 
employers. While they don’t have to worry about paying rent, losing their job means immediate 
homelessness.  
I used to work as a house helper for a family in a different part of town. They chased me 
out of their house at 3 in the morning! 
 
Families and Family Networks 
To understand the needs and resources available to each interview participant and the 
strategies they employed to make a living, it was crucial to gather information on their family 
situation, both in terms of immediate family and extended family. In some cases, family 
networks were a source of income and opportunities, in others they were a financial burden 
and a barrier to progress.  
Camp Refugees 
In terms of family situations, I found significant differences between refugees who had 
moved to Nairobi from the camps and those who had come directly from Somalia. Camp 
refugees shared similarities with rural-urban labor migrants in that only one or two members of 
a family came to the city to find work, while spouses with children and elderly parents stayed 
behind. One young woman’s story was typical of these situations: 
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I used to be married but I got divorced … My father is in Somalia, but my mother is in 
Kakuma. Since I don’t have a husband I decided to come to Nairobi to work and give the 
little I get to my mom. It’s very difficult but I have to be patient because of my mother. If 
I decide to marry again, that new husband might support me but not my mother. He 
might even not allow me to do anything for my family. That’s why I decided not to marry 
but to support my mother. I can’t give her everything she needs, but at least I can help 
some. 
 
In another situation, a woman left her small child with the grandmother in the camp so she 
could work as a live-in house helper in Nairobi. A young man specifically came to support his 
siblings: 
[I came to Nairobi] to support my brothers and sisters. They are in Kakuma; they are 
studying there. I also went to school in Kakuma, but I’ve come here to hustle for them 
so they can continue their life and their studies there. 
 
Because these young men and women only come to Nairobi to support relatives in the 
camp, they often operate on a very tight budget, trying to save as much of their income as 
possible to send ‘home.’ They endure greater hardships, such as the harsh life of a domestic 
worker or the cramped living conditions of shared rooms, and hardly spend anything on 
recreation or personal goals. Many communicate with family members in the camps on an 
almost daily basis and are constantly reminded of the needs and the familial obligations they 
are working to fulfill. 
My father calls me all the time. He is asking: Do you have something? What did you 
earn? But I don’t have anything. I can’t give anything to my brothers. 
 
Although these camp refugees seem stuck in a fairly hopeless situation between the perpetual 
limbo of life in the camp and familial obligations forcing them to endure hardship in Nairobi, 
they generally seemed to have a positive outlook on life. For one, many had ongoing 
resettlement cases and held on to the ultimate dream of one day going to America. In addition, 
they had interacted with the refugee regime in the past and were aware of potential 
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opportunities coming from NGOs, even though none had specific hopes to personally receive 
aid in the immediate future. Most of all, though, these young men and women just showed the 
energy and hope of a new generation trying to build a life for themselves. Some expressed 
hopes of getting married and starting a family; others dreamed of starting their own business. 
Connections to the diaspora seem to play a key role in realizing aspirations. While none 
of the interview participants admitted to getting support from relatives in the US6, and quite a 
few complained about the way they had been abandoned by ‘those in America’, I observed a 
number of community member who at least occasionally received financial support from 
extended family in the USA, especially in the form of investments or collaborative business 
ventures. One young man summed up the support from the diaspora: 
There are some [in the USA] who help their families, but not other people, and even in 
those cases there is no guaranteed support. Its’s only sometimes. But only for family 
members. You might get something one month and nothing the next month. 
 
In some cases, Somali Bantus in the diaspora have family both in the refugee camp in 
Kenya and in Somalia, and have to decide who is most urgently in need of their support. 
Usually, remittances to Somalia have priority to those in Nairobi. However, some US-based 
Somali Bantus see Kenya as a place to invest. I was told of several cases where Somali Bantus in 
the US decided to buy real estate in coastal Kenya and had relatives in Nairobi oversee the 
construction of a house. In other cases, Somali Bantu men come to Kenya to look for a wife, 
sometimes without the intent of bringing them to the US. One participant explained: 
 
6 To a degree, this was undoubtedly due to response bias. The interviewer was seen as a foreigner with access to 
resources and emphasizing vulnerability and neediness during the interview was sometimes a strategic decision to 
improve chances or receiving aid. Observing living and working conditions, however, confirmed that many 
interview participants did not receive significant remittances.   
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There are those who come from the USA, men who married Somali Bantu refugee 
women … But you know, those people marry them and then leave them here. They will 
come and stay with them for about three months during their holiday, then they will go 
back. 
 
In one case, a Somali Bantu woman married a man from the USA who already had a wife 
there. As the second wife, there was no way for her to join her husband in America, but she 
was content to receive monthly remittances from him. Even $100 or $200 per month from a 
husband overseas can change the situation of a Somali Bantu woman in Nairobi dramatically. 
While these women might still decide to pursue work in order to support their families in the 
refugee camps, they don’t have to worry about their basic needs like housing and food, and 
might free up more time to socialize.  
Urban Migrants 
Somali Bantus coming directly to Nairobi from urban centers in Somalia overall have 
very different family situations. Instead of coming as individuals with close connections to 
family back ‘home’, these migrants often travel as a family looking for a better life in Kenya. In a 
number of cases widows or divorced women come to Kenya with their children in search of 
safety and better education. In other cases, the husband will come to Nairobi looking for better 
job opportunities and bring his wife and children along.  
Living in Nairobi with a family includes a different set of familial obligations. Rather than 
working hard and sending all the money to family members in the camp, those living with 
children in Nairobi have to cater to the daily needs of their family and find solutions to a wide 
range of problems, including education and healthcare. As mentioned above, providing food 
and shelter for a family in Nairobi is more demanding than surviving as an individual, and often 
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the head of the household has to make very difficult decisions on what to spend their savings 
on. 
Widows with a number of children are in a particularly challenging situation. They have 
the additional expenses of caring for their children, but they also don’t have the option of 
working as live-in house helpers. So they have to start their own business as hawkers, selling 
home-made food or beverages on the streets or in the malls. These women, out of necessity, 
are independent and willing to take risks, and when necessary ask neighbors for help. They are 
able to find the cheapest schools and hospitals to take their children to, often government 
facilities of very poor quality. While the mothers have little hope of improving their own 
situation, they invest in their children hoping to give them the option of a brighter future. 
More common than widows with children are families where both parents live together, 
sometimes with a grandparent. These families avoid the refugee camps as much as possible, 
being used to life in an urban setting. Since they don’t have relatives to support in camps, they 
are able to focus on improving their own situation. In some cases, both the husband and the 
wife have to work to make ends meet, while in others the husband was able to find a steady job 
and provide for his entire family. Several of these families were able to afford a small 
apartment with two or three rooms. Two participants had one room set up as living room with 
a sofa and a TV.  
While the apartment was still modest, the difference in living conditions struck me as 
significant enough that I discussed it with a key informant. He reminded me that a sofa or a TV 
does not necessarily imply a greater income, as these things represent one-time purchases that 
might only reflect a temporary windfall. He also explained that the difference in living 
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conditions was primarily due to a difference in values. Somali Bantu who used to live in 
Mogadishu place a greater value on a nice home than those who lived in a mud hut in a rural 
village. As one participant noted:  
Those who came from Shabelle are more integrated with other Somalis. They are more 
likely to have Somali friends, they speak their language, they even take on some of their 
character. So they are somewhat better off than the ones from Jubaland. The ones from 
Juba don’t know anything! 
 
These differences in background had an impact on extended family networks and social 
capital, as well. Somali Bantu from Mogadishu and other urban centers were less likely to have 
relatives in the USA and thus could not rely on remittances. And as they were less likely to 
register as refugees, they also had less hope of resettlement to America. But they were more 
likely to have Somali friends and in some cases, at least, this cultural capital translated into 
more stable work situations and better work conditions. 
Community Support 
Demographics and Structures 
Understanding community structures and support systems was an important focus of 
the needs assessment. Interview participants were asked about their personal social networks, 
about their knowledge of the community in general, and about their experiences of community 
support. The answers varied considerably based on the background, the time spent in Nairobi, 
and the occupation of the participant. However, no participant claimed to have a good 
overview over the community as a whole. One person commented:  
When we pass on the street, we meet each other. But we don’t have a census or 
anything. 
 
Participants were asked to estimate the number of Somali Bantu in Nairobi, and estimates 
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varied from a few hundred to over one thousand. However, participants had different ideas as 
to whether there were more Somali Bantu from the Shabelle or the Juba rivers, and whether 
there were more single adults or more family, indicating that people belong to different social 
networks and don’t know much about the community beyond their network. As a result, it is 
impossible to make any generalized statements about the demographics of the Somali Bantu 
community in Nairobi.  
Participants were overall in agreement that the community has no organization and 
there are no leaders. One exception was a young man who claimed that some of the subgroups 
such as the Shidle and Shabelle had their own associations where members met and 
communicated regularly. However, he explained, to be part of the group one had to contribute 
financially, and as he was unable to do so, he was not included in any of the communication. 
Other than this one participant, nobody knew of any kind of formalized community 
structure. One man summarized: “[The Somali Bantu in Nairobi] don’t have a community or 
appointed somebody as leader,” while another participant explained:  
There is nothing like that. Everybody is just struggling to survive by themselves. We 
don’t have the brains to come together and organize people! … People are not thinking 
in those terms. Everybody is just looking to meet their own needs. 
 
This lack of formal structure or organization meant that different Somali Bantus had very 
different experiences of social cohesion and support based on their individual networks. For 
reasons detailed below, some were well-connected, while others seemed very isolated.  
Ten participants (50%) reported not having many Somali Bantu contacts in Nairobi. 
Those most isolated were two domestic workers who hardly left the house, followed by two 
people who had only been in Nairobi for a year or less and had not had much time to integrate 
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into the community. Other participants with few community contacts included a young man 
who had married a Kenyan national, and a housewife who seemed to only visit a few selected 
friends.7 Somewhat surprising, three participants reported mainly having ethnic Somali friends. 
All three were women who had lived in Mogadishu before coming to Nairobi, and one specified 
that her Somali friends were people she had known in Somalia previously. These three women 
confirmed the statement quoted in the previous section: 
Those who came from Shabelle are more integrated with other Somalis. They are more 
likely to have Somali friends, they speak their language, they even take on some of their 
character. 
 
Those participants who seem well-connected in the Somali Bantu community mostly fall into 
two categories. On the one hand are migrants from Mogadishu who have extended family 
networks in Nairobi. I interviewed members of two different family networks; both consisted of 
multiple married couples with children and grandparents who live close together. Some family 
members had stayed in Nairobi for many years and had stable jobs. Newcomers are able to 
benefit from the connections and the experience of their relatives. One man, for example, 
found a job through his uncle. And when I asked one woman how Somali Bantus supported 
each other in emergency situations, she simply replied: “My aunt will call the others.” 
On the other hand, I discovered a group of Somali Bantus who seemed very well-
connected even though they did not have family members in Nairobi and many had only 
arrived in the past year or two. These refugees all had in common that they had lived in the 
 
7 As with many urban Islamic communities, Somali Bantu in Nairobi expressed an marriage ideal of the wife staying 
and working at home while the husband leaves the home to earn a living for the family. This ideal is unattainable 
for many, usually because the husband is absent or unable to provide enough income. However, in one case at 
least, the result seemed to be a high degree of social isolation for the housewife. 
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refugee camps for many years. Most were young men who had grown up and gone to school in 
Kakuma, and who were part of extended friend groups in the refugee camps. One participant 
who had been in Nairobi less than two years explained about his community contacts here: 
“There are a lot who I know. We came together from the refugee camp.” He estimated that 
there are hundreds of young Somali Bantus who have come from Kakuma in recent years, 
adding: 
Some I know from seeing, others I know by name. They are many. Some are in Eastleigh, 
some in Section 3, some in town. 
 
One of my initial contacts in the community introduced me to a number of her 
childhood friends who had come to Nairobi, including a very-well connected woman who 
claimed to know about 300 Somali Bantus from Kakuma in Nairobi, although some had 
returned to the camp. In fact, this extended network of young adults from Kakuma is constantly 
in flux as new people come and others leave, or return. But it is here that I could observe the 
highest degree of community cohesion beyond family members. It was only among young 
refugees from Kakuma that participants told me they “communicate a lot” or even “help each 
other a lot”. 
Communication and Support 
In many ways, Eastleigh is divided into those who have to work to make a living, and 
those who are supported via remittances. Eastleigh is known for its vibrant nightlife as Somali 
refugees who receive money from abroad often stay up late and socialize. In the mornings, 
business is slow and the streets are mostly empty. Refugees who have a job, one the other 
hand, often work seven up to 12 hours a day, 7 days per week, giving them little time for social 
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life. Within the Somali community, Friday is generally considered a holiday, and some 
businesses in Eastleigh close for the whole day or at least for the afternoon. But I’ve previously 
met Somalis refugees who complained that their employer wouldn’t even give them leave on 
important holidays such as Id ul-Fitr and Id ul-Adha. The situation is even worse for many 
domestic workers who complain having to work from early in the morning until late at night. 
Most interview participants agreed that there is little time to meet others in the 
community. This was true both of people with few contacts and of those who were well-
connected. One person with a lot of friends explained: 
Most of the daytime we’re busy working. We don’t have time for friends because when 
we leave our friends it’s already nighttime. And we can’t go and visit our friends at 
nighttime because we’re afraid of the Kenyan police … so you can say we have no time 
to visit our friends. 
 
Another participant agreed with this assessment, but qualified it somewhat: 
We don’t communicate since everyone has their own problems. But we have each 
other’s phone numbers. On Fridays we sometimes come together or call each other. If 
someone has a problem, they will inform the others: We have this problem, please 
come tomorrow or on that date. Otherwise, everybody is going to their jobs every day, 
trying to survive, so we don’t have chances to see one another. 
 
One woman who worked as a house helper described the difficulty of even making the time to 
come for the interview. She had to plead with her employer to let her go, lying that it was a 
close family member to required her. 
While virtually everybody in Nairobi has a mobile phone and even smartphones are 
widespread, most people uses pre-paid plans and many pay by the minute. Calls are generally 
cheap at 2 or 3 Shillings a minute, and credit can be bought in very low quantities of 20 or 50 
shillings, making phone use very affordable. Nevertheless, many refugees have to manage their 
phone time carefully and often keep calls as short as absolutely possible. In my experience, 
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refugees will often call each other very briefly just to send a short greeting as a way of 
maintaining the relationship, but long conversations on the phone are rare.  
More important than keeping up with friends in the neighborhood are long-distance 
relationships with extended family members. Both Somali and Somali Bantu refugees use Wi-Fi 
connections to have long video chats with relatives in distant places. A number of Somali 
Bantus told me of a family member in Somalia, in the refugee camp, or in the USA who they talk 
to on a daily basis. 
My interview participants generally agreed that there was a lack of communication 
within the community. One women with few contacts complained: 
The problem is, they don’t communicate much with each other. That’s why I don’t know 
more about them. 
 
A young man who had been in Nairobi less than two years admitted that he mainly 
communicated with his family and friends in the refugee camp, but rarely with people in 
Nairobi. Another man told me of a WhatsApp group that connected Somali Bantus in the 
refugee camp with those in the USA. But he added: 
I used to be part of that group … It’s mainly the older people in Kakuma who are 
continuing that group. The younger people are not part of it. 
 
The main way many Somali Bantus interact with each other is when they meet on the streets or 
in their places of work. Some of those interactions are accidental and superficial, as described 
in this account: 
I might see you today, but then I don’t see you tomorrow. I don’t know where you’re 
staying. I just see you on the street. I don’t know where you sleep. We just greet each 
other, then we go. Like that. 
 
But other meetings are intentional and purposeful. Especially young men seek out their 
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contacts on a regular basis when they look for work or when they need a place to stay. One 
tailor described his search for work: 
There is no special place that I go to every day, but I just go around and ask friends if 
there is a job for today. That’s how I do it. 
 
Another participants explained how the constant threat of evictions is a motivation to 
communicate: 
When someone has been locked out of their room and is looking for another room, 
that’s when they visit others, looking for a place to sleep. That’s when we meet and ask 
one another how the situation is. 
 
It is in emergency situations when social networks are activated the most. Some 
participants told me they call their friends for help when the police have arrested them and are 
demanding money. Via the ubiquitous mobile money service M-Pesa refugees can easily 
transfer money to each other, or even directly to police officers to ransom a friend. The same 
service can be used to collect money for a medical emergency or in case of a burial. One man 
described: 
When they experience a certain problem, for example if somebody dies, the younger 
men will call one another and collect a little bit of money to assist that person. Or if 
somebody else is in a serious problem like somebody was in a fight or was arrested by 
the police, they will organize themselves immediately and collect a little amount to 
assist that person. 
 
I followed up on that statement to find out of there had been cases of death among the Somali 
Bantu community in Nairobi, and he told me: 
There was a Somali Bantu girl not far from here who died, just two weeks ago. She was 
sick. There was some help from those who lived in Nairobi who shared a little bit with 
them, and also those abroad have assisted. But only for a burial, since you can’t just 
leave the body in the house. But there was no money for a funeral. 
 
While several participants pointed out that begging is shameful, there seem to be cases in 
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which it is justified. In a conversation about medical needs, a young father explained: 
If I have a problem that big, like an operation, I go to the people I know and ask them for 
assistance. Maybe someone can give me 200, someone generous can give me 500, 
something like that. 
 
The amounts he mentioned are very small, far less than a police arrest could cost, and definitely 
not enough to cover a surgery. They demonstrate they importance of a large social network in 
an emergency, so that many small contributions can cover the cost of a larger bill.  
A number of participants emphasized that community members are unable to support 
each other financially because of the lack of money across the community.  
None of them is better than the other, how are they supposed to help each other? If I 
have something, I can help you. But if I have nothing at all, how can I help you? In terms 
of being Muslims, we can help each other. Like, if you have a problem at home, we 
come and help solve it. But in terms of assisting each other financially, we can’t do that. 
 
It is hard to control for bias in statements such as these, that emphasize the lack of financial 
resources across the community. To an extent, interview participants were hoping that the 
needs assessment would result in some kind of external assistance to them individually or the 
community in general, and thus downplaying the ability of the community to meet individual 
needs might have seemed advantageous. As I will discuss in the next section, refugees in 
Eastleigh have developed strategies to appear more vulnerable vis a vis aid agencies to increase 
the likelihood of assistance. However, based on my observations within the community and the 
comparison of different interviews, It seems very likely that many participants indeed received 
very little financial assistance from other Somali Bantus. Money given is limited to small 
amounts and usually restricted to emergency situations. 
However, the above quote also demonstrates the exchange of non-financial assistance. 
This includes, perhaps most frequently, sharing food and housing with community members 
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who are hungry or homeless. It also includes helping with job searches and sharing commission 
work among tailors. The participant quoted above mentions religious counseling as a way of 
assisting in situations of domestic conflict, and another participant mentioned prayers as a kind 
of support. Perhaps the most surprising form of non-financial assistance was mentioned by a 
young women: 
If someone is taken to the hospital and needs blood donations, they can help with that. 
 
This statement was made by somebody who had lived in Nairobi for many years and 
experienced community members being involved in serious accidents. Since hospitals in Nairobi 
generally only stock a very limited supply of donor blood, it is common for relatives or friends of 
patients to donate blood in such a case. Other interview participants seemed to be fairly 
unfamiliar with modern medical procedures.  
In some interviews I brought up the idea of organizing the community to pool ideas and 
resources for the benefit of all. Several participants responded very positively: 
It would be good to do that; we could benefit from it. Because what is in my mind is not 
the same as in your mind. If we come together and share ideas, we might be able to 
create a better life. 
 
One man agreed with the benefit of community organization, but thought it should include the 
Somali Bantu diaspora in the USA so that remittances could be made more strategically: 
Personally, I could suggest that we form a committee here in Nairobi, and another one 
in the US, then we can communicate over the phone, then they can assist us. That way I 
think we can improve our future and make better lives. For them, they can even create 
jobs for the ones here. And those who are here, we can even create a group by calling 
people together – you know if I know five people, and he knows five people, we can 
each call the five we know and come together and create a group. Then we can create 
jobs, we can be self-employed. That way it might work. 
 
Others, however, seemed less hopeful that the Somali Bantu community could find the will or 
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the capacity to come together, and nobody seemed motivated enough to volunteer their 
efforts in making these ideas happen. 
After interviewing several families with small children, I asked one of the last interview 
participants whether it would be possible for mothers to organize a daycare so that they could 
still go to work: 
Researcher: I’ve met several women who are staying at home with the babies. Is there a 
way to have childcare so they could also work? 
 
Participant: No. Only the neighbors, but they are busy working themselves. 
 
R: What if the woman staying at home with the babies could take care of the children of 
all her friends so that they could go to work and earn something? 
 
P: No, that’s not possible. They don’t trust one another. 
 
R: Even among the Somali Bantu? You don’t trust other people with your children? 
 
P: No, you can’t trust them with your children!  
 
This response was surprising and would need some follow-up research to validate and explain. 
Refugee Services 
In the waiting rooms of several international NGOs working with refugees in Nairobi, I 
came across a large poster titled “Refugees in the City.” It lists, in a radial diagram, all the 
organizations offering services to refugees in Nairobi, categorized by the kind of assistance 
provided. The number of organizations on the chart is impressive: 18 non-governmental, 4 
governmental, and 1 intergovernmental organization. Unfortunately, the poster does not 
provide any contact information or office locations, only the UNHCR Kenya hotline number is 
listed.  
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Government Services and UNHCR 
According to the poster, the Kenyan government provides the following services to 
refugees: Registration & Documentation through the RAS, Protection through both the RAS and 
the Kenyan police, medical services through governmental hospitals, and education through 
public schools.  
The police station assigned to Eastleigh is Pangani police station, at a distance of about 
2.5km from the center of Eastleigh. There is a significant police presence in Eastleigh, both 
uniformed and plain-clothed officers. As mentioned in previous sections, Somali Bantu refugees 
regularly interact with the Kenyan police, but do not feel protected by them at all. Instead, the 
Kenyan police is generally seen as the greatest source of insecurity for urban refugees.  
The RAS offices closest to Eastleigh are located in Shauri Moyo, a neighborhood on the 
south side of Eastleigh, about 3km from where most of the interview participants lived. ‘Shauri 
Moyo’, as the offices are called, is well known by most refugees. Eight participants mentioned it 
by name, and 5 interview participants told of going to Shauri Moyo to register as refugees in 
Nairobi. One had gone several years ago and described the process as quick and easy. She was 
registered, approved as a refugee, and received her refugee ID. Others went to register as well 
but experienced significant delays and had not finished the registration process at the time of 
the interview. One participant had gone to RAS to get his case transferred from Kakuma to 
Nairobi but was rejected and told to return to the refugee camp. Others didn’t even bother 
going to Shauri Moyo because they knew they were not eligible to receive help there, or 
because they didn’t think that receiving refugee status was worth the effort. Only one man 
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expressed interest in applying for documents at Shauri Moyo, but claimed he didn’t know how 
to get there: 
Here in Nairobi, some people say: There is Shauri Moyo. I don’t know where that is. Go 
to Shauri Moyo and get ID. I don’t know how to get there. I know nothing about it … If 
you can assist me, you can take me to Shauri Moyo. That would be very good, so I can 
get ID, UNCHR passport. 
 
Several interview participants claimed that Shauri Moyo was the only service for refugees that 
they knew of. 
A number of Somali Bantu refugees were aware of government hospitals and schools. 
Eight of the interview participants had school-aged children in Nairobi and thus needed to find 
educational services. Not every participant specified which school their children attended, but 
most were aware of public schools. Several pointed out that going to public schools required 
documentation. One person who was not documented explained that their kids were not able 
to go to a free public school while another person had enrolled her children despite being 
undocumented. They complained that the school kept asking for identification but so far the 
children had been able to attend school without providing any. A third participant was 
registered in the refugee camp but had enrolled several children in the public primary and 
secondary schools in Eastleigh. However, while these schools are official free of charge, 
participants complained about a number of hidden fees. Some children had to pay 6,000 8per 
term for school lunches, others had to pay for additional tuition on the weekends, or the 
parents had to contribute a fee of 1,000 per quarter to the parent-teacher association. One 
woman added: 
 
8 About $60. See footnote above regarding currency and exchange rate. 
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In addition, there are some other things were the teachers tell us bring 150 shillings. 
Those ones, the government is not aware of, but the teachers tell us to pay them. 
 
Several mothers complained that the cost of education was a big problem and that the school 
would send their children home if there were unpaid bills. One person admitted that their 
children were not attending any school because they could not afford the fees. 
A number of interview participants lived close to the government hospital on 4 Street in 
Section 1 of Eastleigh, and most were aware of the existence of the hospital and the fact that 
services were free. Nine interview participants discussed the government hospital and at least 6 
mentioned going there to seek medical help. However, only one participant was satisfied with 
the services they received. Everybody else complained about the fact that while doctor’s 
consultations are free, the hospital pharmacy does not carry any medicine. One mother 
explained: 
I went there once. I took my child. They checked and then they said: Your child has a 
cold. Then they wrote a prescription and told me to go and buy the medicine outside. 
Most of the time they don’t have the medicine you need … St. Teresa is better because 
they have the medicine in the hospital. At the government hospital, they’ll write you a 
prescription but you have to buy the medicine at the private pharmacy where they 
charge you a lot of money. 
 
Another person added that lab work such as blood tests or x-rays are also not available at the 
government hospital and need to be purchased at private facilities. There seemed to be some 
confusion about what services are actually available and also about the documentation needed 
to access them. While one participant claimed that it wasn’t possible to have a delivery at the 
government hospital, another woman pointed out that she delivered her child there. And while 
one person stated that they did not need to provide any kind of documentation when visiting 
the government hospital, another one said that the hospital needs some kind of identification 
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but will accept any kind of refugee document. One man, finally, complained that he wasn’t able 
to access government services because he had lost his only document. 
The fact that interview participants did not see much value in the free doctor’s visits at 
government hospitals can be explained through the overall health-seeking behavior of refugees 
in Eastleigh and in the camps. In many cases of sickness, refugees don’t go to the doctor at all, 
but simply go to the closest pharmacy and ask the ‘doctor’ there – usually just a clinical officer –  
which medicine they should take. The most common options include painkillers and antibiotics. 
One interview participant reflected this attitude in her response: 
The doctor is good, in terms of consultation and diagnosis, and he might give you some 
painkiller. But the better medicine you have to buy from the pharmacy. They can’t treat 
you like the doctors from the pharmacy. 
 
Once refugees have registered with RAS at Shauri Moyo, the second step is usually to visit the 
UNHCR, the one intergovernmental organization listed on the poster mentioned at the 
beginning of the section. Not only does the UNHCR process resettlement cases for refugees 
hoping for third-country resettlement, but through their urban program the UNHCR also 
provides some basic services to refugees. On top of that, the UNHCR is also a good place to get 
referrals to NGOs providing services in the Nairobi area. In my conversations with refugee 
providers, there was often an assumption that before refugees approached an NGO, they 
would have already been to UNHCR. 
The UNHCR offices in Nairobi are located off Wayaki Way in Westlands, more than 8km 
from Eastleigh. That means refugees have to pay for a 30 minute taxi ride or figure out how to 
take two busses to get there. Once they make it to the UNHCR offices, they encounter very 
tight security measures. Refugees wait outside the building for their appointment, then they 
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are allowed into a special area to talk to an officer behind on the other side of a window, 
somewhat similar to the consular section of an embassy. If they don’t have an appointment, 
they can let the guards know why they have come and wait outside in case somebody has time 
to talk to them. There are usually dozens of refugees from different nationalities camping out 
outside the building in the hopes of getting an appointment. Some who are homeless might 
spend days or weeks around the UNHCR offices, hoping for shelter. They are, of course, very 
vulnerable to police harassment there, and aid workers have confirmed that occasionally the 
police will detain a whole truckload of refugees right in front of the UNHCR to deport them to 
the refugee camps. 
One of the interview participants, a woman who had lived in Nairobi for a long time and 
who seemed to be in a fairly stable situation, was aware of the services the UNHCR provides 
and had actually been to the offices in Westlands to ask for assistance. She described being 
referred to UNHCR by an NGO: 
We have some help here from UNHCR. One time they told me to go to Kakuma. But 
personally, I can’t live there in Kakuma. 
 
When asked what advice she could give to newcomers in Nairobi, one thing she mentioned was 
to “know the guys at UNHCR.” 
Another participant had only arrived in Nairobi recently with the specific intent of 
moving his case from the refugee camp to Nairobi. He summed up his experience: 
I came to Nairobi to look for assistance from any NGOs. I asked others and they told me 
to go to Westlands. There is an NGO working for refugee affairs in Westlands. Then I 
went there and those people told me I have to go to Shauri Moyo … I have tried to 
communicate with them so many times but the last person I talked to told me to go 
back to Kakuma. I didn’t get any assistance from them. 
 
I confirmed that the ‘NGO’ he was talking about was UNHCR. 
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Other than these two, no other participant reported having actually been to the UNHCR 
offices, and several had never even heard of them. Especially refugees who had come from the 
camps and were used to interacting with the UNHCR there were surprised when I asked about 
their offices in Nairobi. One young man responded: “I head there is UNHCR in Nairobi, but I 
don’t know where it is.” When I asked him if he had ever traveled to other parts of Nairobi 
outside of Eastleigh he said: “No, I’m just here.” 
Many Somali Bantus had arrived by bus right into the center of Eastleigh and never seen 
other parts of Nairobi. They seemed to only move around in a very small area within Eastleigh 
between their home and their place of work, always careful to avoid the police. Leaving 
Eastleigh to explore Nairobi seemed like a terrifying idea to some. While it is true that 
compared to the refugee camp, the complexity and size of Nairobi can be confusing and it 
would be easy to get lost, it is also somewhat ironic that refugees are more afraid of moving 
around Nairobi than of being in Eastleigh. Studies have shown that police harassment is much 
more prevalent in Eastleigh than in other parts of Nairobi. Refugees in Kasarani, for example, 
report only half as many arrests and pay only half the amount of bribes to police as those in 
Eastleigh. Yet many interview participants seemed confined to the very neighborhood that 
posed the highest risk to them. 
NGO Services 
I had worked in Eastleigh for many years prior to this study and thought I knew the 
neighborhood well. I had even had Somali refugees give me tours of Eastleigh, pointing out 
important places and introducing me to various friends and acquaintances along the way. Yet in 
all my time I had never encountered an NGO serving refugees in Eastleigh – other than, of 
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course, the Mennonite Fellowship Center mentioned in Chapter 1, where adult refugees were 
offered ESL and computer classes, as well as access to a reading room. Occasionally I would see 
an ambulance from Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) driving down the street, but I had never 
encountered an advertisement or an outreach event, or seen a sign on a building indicating the 
presence of a refugee NGO. So I was very surprised to see the list of 18 NGOs listed on the 
poster “Refugees in the City”, and to hear about the various services offered to refugees in 
Eastleigh. An Internet search quickly revealed that most of these NGOs do not specify any office 
locations in Eastleigh, and even online map services do not list most of their locations. So I 
decided to visit the main offices of several of these organizations, instead. 
Most refugee NGOs have their main offices on the West side of Nairobi, in 
neighborhoods such as Kilimani, Lavington, or Westlands. These are all upper-middle class areas 
at least one hour from Eastleigh by public transport. In some cases, as with the Refugee 
Consortium of Kenya (RCK) or the Danish Refugee Council (DRC), the offices are on a separate 
plot with a sign at the gate. The gate is guarded, however, and without an appointment it is 
difficult to even get to the reception. In other cases, such as with IRC or RefugePoint, the offices 
are located in a larger office building but do not have a sign outside the building or anything 
else indicating their presence. To reach the reception of the NGO, I had to explain myself to the 
reception or guard of the entire office building, knowing exactly where I wanted to go. In all 
cases, it seemed clear that walk-in clients were discouraged.  
After visiting the main offices, I was then directed to the Eastleigh branches of several 
organizations: DRC and MSF have offices on 3rd Ave, while IRC, Kituo Cha Sheria, and HIAS have 
offices on Chai Rd. The first two are actually within Eastleigh and at a comfortable walking 
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distance from most interview participants. MSF only offers limited medical services, but DRC 
has a robust refugee program including livelihood training, education, and psychosocial 
support. However, the DRC branch offices are located in the back of a large Pentecostal Church, 
which might be a barrier to some of the mainly Muslim refugees in Eastleigh, and there is no 
sign on the church indicating their presence. Nevertheless, in terms of geography it was the 
most accessible location of all NGOs I visited. HIAS, which also offers extensive services to 
refugees in Eastleigh was also located within walking distance, albeit a much longer walk. 
Situated at the very end of Chai Rd, the HIAS offices are technically not in Eastleigh but in 
neighboring Pangani, and to reach them a client had to know exactly where they were going, as 
the offices are in a residential area of what is essentially a gated community. However, the HIAS 
offices are some of very few actually indicated on Google Maps, making navigation much 
easier. IRC and Kitua Cha Sheria, while also on Chai Rd, are located deep inside Pangani, a long 
walk for most Eastleigh residents. They are both found in the same building, an office building 
with formidable security. Neither NGO has a sign on the outside of the building or a location on 
Google Maps, and even those who know what they are looking for have to make it past the 
guarded gate to reach the reception. This seemed especially ironic in the case of IRC, where I 
was told that walk-in clients are very welcome. 
I was quite impressed by the program offered by RefugePoint, a comprehensive package 
of services targeting vulnerable refugees in Nairobi. However, the organization does not have 
any offices in the Eastleigh area; their only office location is in Kilimani, an hour away by bus. 
The office is inside a building called Titan Plaza, but there is no sign to be found and the offices 
are only accessible through a small side entrance. It took me a good bit of searching before I 
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had found the right place, and then I had to convince the guard to let me into the elevator. 
Reaching the right floor, I discovered that the office door was locked and also guarded, creating 
a second barrier before I could reach the reception.  
Overall, my experience of visiting refugee service providers was marked by physical and 
geographical barriers clearly intended to prevent unwanted clients from reaching those 
services. I had the advantage of internet access, private transportation, language skills, and of 
course the privilege of white skin, and it still took considerable effort to reach the reception of 
any refugee NGO in Nairobi. It is hard to imagine how a new refugee without those resources 
would ever overcome those barriers.  
This was confirmed by statements from interview participants. Eighty percent of 
participants simply did not know that any of these NGOs existed as none of them had a visible 
presence within their neighborhood. An additional 10% had heard of the existence of NGOs but 
had never interacted with them. One man who had been in Nairobi for over 2 years told me: 
I haven’t seen it personally, although I have heard that there are some NGOs helping 
refugees in Nairobi. But I have not come across any of them. 
 
Another participant who had been in Nairobi for about 2 years could name HIAS and RCK and 
had heard of people who were assisted by them. But she explained: 
I wanted to go and ask them for help, but I haven’t found the time yet, because I’m busy 
getting the children fed, taking them to school, taking care of them. If I try to look for an 
NGO today, I’ll have to close my business and the children might not eat today. 
 
This sentiment was echoed by other participants. Asking for help meant that they had to pay 
money for transportation and that they lost the income for that day. The two participants who 
had actually personally interacted with an NGO were, ironically, some of the least needy and 
vulnerable I talked to. Both had come to Nairobi from Mogadishu and had been here for many 
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years. Both had husbands with steady incomes and thus had the time and the money to pursue 
other options. One of these women recounted her experience: 
There are some. One is called HIAS, and one Heshima Kenya. But I’ve never gotten 
anything from them. I went once, they told me they would call me, but they never did. 
 
When asked whether she knew of other people who had received assistance, she responded: 
Yes. They went back again and again. They are the ones who have the money for the bus 
fare to go there all the time … If you don’t go all the time you won’t get anything. 
 
Only one out of 20 participants had actually received any services from an NGO. She received 
6,000 Shillings from HIAS, then was referred to UNHCR. She also went to Heshima Kenya (now 
called RefuShe), but was not eligible for support there. It is significant to point out that this 
participant was one of few who was registered as a refugee in Nairobi and had the proper 
identity documents. 
During my interviews with refugee service providers, I was generally impressed by the 
services offered. However, in addition to the mentioned physical and geographic barriers, I 
came across two other barriers that made it impossible for most Somali Bantus to access those 
services. One of those barriers involved legal documentation. Several NGOs explained to me 
that they were only able to provide assistance to refugees who were registered as urban 
refugees and authorized to live in Nairobi. The rationale given was that other refugees could 
receive assistance in the camps and thus donor funds directed to urban refugees should not be 
wasted on refugees who were already budgeted for elsewhere. Of course, this policy excluded 
all the Somali Bantus who had come from the refugee camps because they needed additional 
income. Because they were registered in the camp and not in Nairobi, they were automatically 
ineligible for most services in the city. However, camp refugees were not the only ones 
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excluded. As refugee NGOs were well aware of, the Kenyan government had discontinued to 
register urban refugees in 2016. Anybody who came to Nairobi after that either did not bother 
to register at all, or they had registered but then been told to proceed to the camps. As a result, 
anybody who had arrived in Nairobi since 2016 would not be able to receive the required 
documents to obtain assistance from NGOs. Services were only available for those who had 
been in the city for a number of years and had succeeded in getting the proper documentation. 
The final barrier was only identified during my last interview. I had asked the case 
worker about the recruitment process for a particular livelihoods program, and he explained 
that recruitment was done through community leaders. When I prompted him to clarify that 
statement, I was told that RAS and UNHCR conducted special elections for refugees every two 
years. In those elections, refugees were given the opportunity to choose community leaders 
who would represent them vis a vis the refugee regime. It was those community leaders who 
were contacted by NGOs to disseminate information regarding services, and in some instances 
NGOs requested these leaders to identify vulnerable (or otherwise eligible) refugees to be 
selected for assistance. 
From the perspective of the service providers, this system ensured the participation of 
the “refugee community”9 and thus gave voice and power to refugees. It also meant, of course, 
that NGOs had to spend less resources on advertisement and recruitment, and only had to deal 
with select leaders rather than the entire refugee population. 
 
9 In the case of Eastleigh, the imagined community would consist primarily of refugees from Ethiopia and Somalia, 
regardless of their ethnicity. Since most service providers only distinguish between country of origin and not ethnic 
identity, minority groups are mostly invisible and sociopolitical hierarchies and conflicts that refugees bring with 
them are ignored. 
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What these NGO decision-makers apparently failed to see was that the system they 
were using made access to services dependent on politics within the refugee community. In the 
case of Somali refugees, elections were clan-based, ensuring greater representation and power 
for majority clans and further marginalizing minority groups. Somali Bantus, already facing 
multiple levels of discrimination from ethnic Somali refugees in Eastleigh, had no chance of 
being elected as community leaders and were thus at the mercy of prominent refugees from 
powerful clans to receive information or be considered for inclusion in NGO programs.  
I interviewed one case worker who, after three years in the position, now had her first 
Somali Bantu client. When asked why many Somali Bantus did not know about the available 
services, she explained: 
First of all, the community pillar10 that you have is very, very strong. These 
organizations, like us, or HIAS, we go for meetings in Eastleigh. UNHCR, most of the 
time, or Heshima Kenya, or other organizations, they organize meetings for the 
communities. Do they have a community leader, first of all? … You see? They have to re-
organize themselves, come up with a leader, have to approach UNHCR, during election 
they also vote for their own person who the organization will keep on informing about 
these events. There are so many events that happen in Eastleigh for refugees, so many 
awareness on health –you know, outreach programs. Like us, sometimes we have 
outreach programs in Eastleigh. So that one person can disseminate the information to 
them. You see? Like me, I’ve been here for three years. This is the only case I’ve been 
allocated for the past 3 years for Somali Bantus. I’ve never seen them. This is the only 
case I’ve personally worked with … But if they just come out and speak for themselves, 
attend events, there are so many events being organized in Eastleigh. They’ll be noticed. 
But if they keep quiet, you know, and just count themselves as normal Somalis, it will be 
difficult for people to identify them … It’s a matter of them talking for themselves, of 
being empowered. You see? 
  
 





In the previous chapter, I presented the data collected in community interviews and 
service provider interviews from the perspective of the interview participants. The focus was on 
giving voice to Somali Bantu refugees, describing their experiences in their own words and 
through their own interpretive lenses. In this chapter, I will discuss that data within the larger 
context of the literature cited in Chapter 2 and through the lens of several distinct theoretical 
perspectives. This will necessarily lead to some overlap and repetition of information presented 
in previous chapters, while offering greater analytical clarity. 
In the following sections, I use three different analytical frameworks for discussing the 
findings of this study: First, I use a critical perspective to focus on the structural violence 
experienced by Somali Bantu refugees caught between the regimes of the Kenyan government, 
Somali society, and refugee aid agencies. While interview participants are keenly aware of the 
injustice experienced on a daily basis, their understanding of underlying structures and 
mechanisms is limited. Combining primary data with existing literature, I attempt to draw a 
brief picture of the systemic discrimination, marginalization, and exploitation faced by Somali 
Bantu refugees in Nairobi. 
Secondly, I discuss the various ways interview participants navigate and resist the 
barriers they encounter. By focusing on the agency of Somali Bantu refugees, I intend to 
balance the first section by demonstrating that, while victimized, these refugees are not 
helpless victims. Analyzing processes of decision-making and various strategies employed by 
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refugees in important areas of their lives, I discuss the ways they are able to build their lives 
within a very adverse environment. 
Thirdly, I use a community development framework that focusses on community assets 
to describe the resources that exist within the Somali Bantu community and the ways these 
resources are employed for the benefit of individuals and the entire community. This section is 
intended to point towards ways in which the needs assessment can empower the refugee 
community to recognize and utilize their assets and includes a number of recommendations. It 
leads into a final concluding section, in which those recommendations to both refugees and 
services providers are expanded upon, with additional suggestions for further research. 
Structural Violence 
The Kenyan Government 
Refugees in Kenya are caught in a patchwork system of governmentality that exposes 
them to multiple levels of exploitation. The Kenyan government has unambiguously 
communicated their desire to rid the country of refugees in repeatedly declaring their intention 
of closing down refugee camps and returning refugees to their countries of origin. This is 
framed as a national security issue to protect Kenya from crime and terrorism. Kenyan court, 
however, have on numerous times thwarted those plans as contrary to Kenyan and 
international law, and international organizations such as the UNHCR have pressured the 
government to respect refugee conventions previously ratified by Kenya.  
Unable to get rid of refugees in the country directly, the Kenyan government has 
adopted a two-pronged approach of, on the one hand, making life miserable for refugees, and, 
on the other hand, using refugees as scape-goats to score political points. To achieve the first 
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objective, refugees are forced into remote camps in the most inhospitable areas of Kenya. 
Extreme climatic conditions, a lack of basic infrastructure, and neglected host communities11 
ensure a situation characterized by crime, poverty, and poor health. Those who attempt to flee 
these conditions are put into a situation of legal limbo where they are exposed to police 
harassment and labor exploitation and deprived of access to basic services. Forcing refugees 
into criminality provides the government with further ammunition to turn public opinion 
against them, creating a convenient scape-goat for insecurity or unemployment. This gives the 
government the opportunity to respond to domestic crises with police brutality and 
indiscriminate operations against ‘illegal aliens’ to demonstrate their crisis leadership. 
With the abrupt dissolution of the Department of Refugee Affairs and the creation of 
the new Refugee Affairs Secretariat (RAS) in 2016, as well as the cessation of UNHCR status 
determinations in the same year, the Kenyan Government was able to create considerable 
confusion as to the process of registration and documentation of refugees and the refugee 
services provided by the government. Creating bureaucratic barriers did not slow the influx of 
new migrants, it just reduced the number of those granted refugee status, further pushing 
potential asylum seekers into legal limbo and vulnerability. 
The Kenyan police occasionally enforce government policies by detaining refugees in 
Nairobi and taking them to court for staying in the city without authorization or being in the 
country without proper documentation. In addition, the police might return refugees to the 
 
11 The Kakuma and Dadaab refugee camps are situated in poor and marginalized pastoral communities (Turkana 
and Somali, respectively). With the influx of aid resources and remittances, many refugees in those camps find 
themselves in a better situation (in terms of basic needs, healthcare, education, etc.) than the host communities. 
This has often led to envy and conflict between the two groups. 
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camp without a trial, and in some cases even deport them to the country’s borders. More 
often, however, the police act outside of their mandate, directly exploiting refugees 
economically. Extortion of bribes by the police is common in other parts of Kenya, as well, but 
especially pronounced in Eastleigh. Pangani police station, which services Eastleigh, is among 
the most notorious stations in Nairobi in terms of police impunity and deaths in police custody. 
Betts et al. suggest that both the number of arrests and the amount of bribes paid are 
significantly higher in Eastleigh than in other parts of Nairobi, at about twice as high for Kenyan 
Somalis and six times as high for Somali refugees (Betts et al. 2019). Somali refugees in 
particular, are reportedly seen by police as “ATM machines” to collect money from. The fact 
that most arrests never lead to charges, let alone a day in court, confirms this perception. 
Despite public statements and official government policy, law enforcement profits too much 
from the presence of undocumented refugees to actually remove those they arrest to the 
camps. 
Somali Society 
The legal predicaments of refugees and unwillingness of the police to provide protection 
enables other actors to exploit refugees as well. These include both Kenyan nationals and 
refugees themselves seeking cheap labor. While economic exploitation is widespread among 
Kenya’s poor and the protections provided by labor laws are generally ignored in the informal 
economy, refugees are especially vulnerable, both due to their legal situation and their lack of 
social and cultural capital. But not all refugees experience these factors in the same way. 
Minority refugees such as the Somali Bantu, while ignored by most policymakers, suffer much 
the same marginalization and oppression that they experienced in their home countries. Social 
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hierarchies and racialized stigma are exported from Somalia and leveraged by members of 
powerful groups to benefit from the vulnerability of minorities.  
The lack of cultural capital in terms of language skills (English and/or Swahili) and 
cultural competency (awareness of Nairobi geography and society, understanding of Kenyan 
institutions) force Somali Bantu refugees to stay within the Somali community in Eastleigh were 
they can hope to find jobs. The limited options available to them place these refugees in a 
context of racial discrimination characterized by verbal abuse and exploitative work conditions. 
Ethnic Somali refugees often benefit from connections to Kenyan Somali clan-members in the 
Eastleigh business community, in the humanitarian regime, and even in the police force which 
they are able to leverage against Somali Bantus in the case of conflict. These practices have 
been documented for the refugee camps; the interviews conducted for this study reveal that 
they are prevalent in Nairobi, as well. 
Service Providers 
Despite the presence of numerous refugee-serving NGOs in Nairobi and the excellent 
services some of them provide to refugees in Eastleigh, Somali Bantus remain woefully 
underserved by these organizations. To a large degree, this is explained by blind spots among 
NGO staff. Many organizations simply categorize refugees by country of origin (as do the official 
figures published by UNHCR) but fail to distinguish between different ethnic, racial, and caste 
groups within those countries. In some cases this is a deliberate form of ‘colorblindness’ to 
avoid replicating group conflict from the countries of origin in Kenya, in other cases, it is simply 
a lack of training and cross-cultural competency on the side of service providers. Regardless, 
the resulting ignorance is making staff of urban refugee-serving NGOs largely oblivious to the 
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plight of marginalized groups within the refugee community. In one interview, I was told that 
most staff had never even heard of the Somali Bantu, let alone knew of their situation and their 
needs as a minority.  
The practice of many NGOs of utilizing ‘community structures’ that were only created by 
the RAS and UNHCR by conducting elections of refugee ‘leaders’ is reminiscent of colonial 
approaches in Kenya, where British authorities dealt with local ‘chiefs’ to better manage the 
occupied population. By placing the power of selecting refugees for assistance programs into 
the hands of these refugee leaders, NGOs are effectively giving up on anti-discriminatory 
policies of practices of affirmative action, simply assuming that refugee leaders will select 
participants equitably. Historically derived processes of discrimination and marginalization 
present in Somalia thus become replicated in the Somali diaspora in Nairobi. The results have 
been documented in this study: Most Somali Bantus are completely unaware of outreach 
efforts conducted by NGOs, and many haven’t even heard of the existence of these NGOs. 
The policy of NGOs to base eligibility for their programs on proper documentation 
replicates the injustices of the Kenyan government in their treatment of refugees. In effect, any 
change in government policy regarding registration and documentation of refugees results in 
drastic changes to the population served by NGOs, and an increasingly hostile government 
posture over the last years has significantly decreased the number of urban refugees eligible for 
assistance. As a result, many of the most vulnerable (including virtually all newcomers to the 




With the initial outbreak of civil war in southern Somalia and the resulting atrocities and 
famine, many Somali Bantus fled the country on very short notice and without the ability to 
make preparations. As a result, the flight to Kenya was marked by incredible hardship and often 
resulted in the death of family members along the way. In these cases, the situation of Somali 
Bantus matched the global perception of refugees as “helpless victims” (Wirtz 2017). In the 
following decades, however, Somali Bantu migrations within the region have become 
characterized by a high degree of agency and strategic decision-making. This includes the initial 
journey out of Somalia, which is often still a flight from violence and insecurity, but is now 
accompanied by more careful planning. Even in cases where a husband was killed by al-Shabaab 
terrorists, the wife might delay fleeing the country for several months to wait for more 
favorable conditions. In other cases, refugees decide before they embark on their journey 
whether they want to head to the refugee camps or travel directly to an urban center such as 
Nairobi.  
These decision-making processes are even more pronounced once refugees consider 
secondary migrations. Some refugees might decide to register as refugees in Tanzania or 
Uganda, only to return to Kenya after evaluating the economic situation there. Others have 
lived in the refugee camps for many years, assessing the needs of different family members in 
terms of education or healthcare, before deciding to send some individuals to urban areas. The 
journey from Kakuma to Nairobi costs 3,000 shillings and includes numerous police check-
points; it requires careful preparations and financial investments. Those who move to Nairobi 
need to return to the camp temporarily for the sake of a ‘verification exercise’ of registered 
refugees, conducted by camp authorities, or for their next interview in the ongoing 
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resettlement process. Others decide to return to the camp after evaluating their options in 
Nairobi and deciding against the risks of urban life. Once Somali Bantus from the diaspora are 
involved, migration routes become even more complicated. A young woman might move to 
Nairobi to marry a man from the USA, but on his next visit they decide to go see their families in 
the refugee camp together. Another refugee might partner with a relative in the diaspora to 
start a business trading goods between Nairobi and the refugee camp, or to start construction 
on a house in Mombasa. While these cases of increased mobility are rare, they do form part of 
the picture of the Somali Bantu community in Nairobi. Overall, decisions to travel or migrate 
illustrate the agency of Somali Bantu refugees and provide insights into decision-making on 
both individual and family levels. 
Work 
A 12-year old girl working as a domestic servant in the home of a Somali family has very 
little agency. There are several cases within the Somali Bantu community in Nairobi where 
minors were simply taken along when the employers moved to a different country, and 
sometimes abandoned or passed on to another family when those employers no longer had 
need for them. While these extreme cases exist within the community, most Somali Bantus 
have considerably more agency in their choice of work and their strategies to find income and 
to manage their financial resources. Young adults living in Nairobi are usually in constant 
communication with their families and often experience considerable pressure to send 
remittances back to the camp, but overall they experience a high degree of autonomy in their 
life in the city. What kind of work to pursue, when to quit an abusive job, or whether to start 
their own business are all choices these refugees have to make themselves, and their strategies 
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in doing so often reveal long-term plans or dreams.  
There is a strong cultural expectation that women should marry young and be 
housewives while their husbands provide an income for the family, and in some cases these 
conventions are followed, providing women with some amount of financial security but also 
limiting their options of contributing to the needs of the family. In a few cases, especially when 
the children are off to school, wives might try to find work to supplement their husband’s 
income, but more often, women act as heads of households after being widowed or divorced, 
and are forced to provide financially for themselves and their children. In these situations, 
Somali Bantu women rise to the challenge of starting and running their own business, often 
with little or no formal training. 
Men have more options in terms of work opportunities, and Somali Bantu men engage 
in occupations as diverse as religious teachers, cooks, shopkeepers, waiters, or tailors. Finding 
the right job is a common and constant struggle, and refugees strategically utilize their 
extended families and their friend networks to achieve their goals. Particularly when it comes 
to starting businesses, Somali Bantu men demonstrate significant planning and forethought in 
researching costs and market conditions and searching for investment capital to realize their 
dream. 
When they are unable to make ends meet, refugees have a number of options of asking 
for help, negotiating with landlords and employers, asking friends for help, pursuing assistance 
from the diaspora, or moving (back) to the refugee camp. 
Community 
Despite the restrictions of harsh working conditions and limited resources, many Somali 
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Bantu refugees are able to invest in their social networks and reap the benefits of social and 
emotional support. Some utilize their extended family, living together with grandparents or 
moving close to an uncle or a cousin; others nurture close bonds to childhood friends. Even 
those who have left their families behind in the refugee camp try to communicate on a regular 
basis and, when possible, send money to support parents or siblings. Occasionally, they will 
return to the camp for a month or two to visit and help their families, or they will host a family 
member who is traveling to Nairobi to medical treatment. Many Somali Bantus have relatives in 
both Kakuma and Dadaab camps, as well as in Somali and in the USA, embedding them in multi-
local and transnational networks of communication and support. Others have close childhood 
friends who grew up with them as neighbors or schoolmates, and who might regard each other 
almost like family members. Friends who live and work in Eastleigh will check in on each other 
on a regular basis and spend their little free time together. 
For young adults, the biggest decision in terms of investing in their social networks is to 
get married. Women might get married between 14-20 years of age, while men are usually in 
their late 20s or early 30s. This has to do, of course, with the financial burden of the bride price 
and the meher on men, which can go up to several thousand US dollars. As a result, men face a 
significant barrier finding a wife and need to develop complex strategies to raise the funds 
needed for a proper marriage. Those who are getting significant amounts of remittances from 
the US might decide to have two or even three wives, while other wait many years before they 
can afford even one. In the meantime, young men and women in Nairobi have opportunities to 
socialize without supervision or knowledge of parents or other relatives, and in some cases 
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romance leads to secret marriages that will later have to be negotiated with the bride’s 
parents. 
In reflecting on life decisions, some Somali Bantus regret coming to Nairobi. 
Occasionally, a refugee will decide that life in Somalia or in the refugee camp was actually 
better for them, or that a different urban center in East Africa provides more opportunities. But 
overall, Somali Bantus appreciate the opportunities of work, education, and healthcare found in 
Nairobi and are willing to put up with the disadvantages of police harassment and high cost of 
living to make a life here. Those who have registered as refugees have the ultimate dream of 
one day going to America, although at the time of this research many were aware the politics in 
the US made that dream unlikely. 
Resources 
A needs assessment would not be complete without understanding the resources 
available to community members and to the community as a whole. The interviews showed 
that different Somali Bantu refugees in Nairobi have access to different kinds of resources, and 
rather than aiming for individual self-reliance, community members would benefit from pooling 
resources to strengthen the community as a whole. 
The main difference in terms of resource access can be found between Somali Bantus 
from the Juba river and those from Mogadishu and other urban centers. Each sub-group has a 
different set of skills and connections based on their background experiences. While these 
differences can act as a dividing factor, they also have the potential of benefitting the entire 
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community when shared between the sub-groups.12 
Somali Society 
Somali Bantus from the Juba river feel very much as outsiders within Somali society, 
speaking a different language, having a different lifestyle and culture, and not having 
participated in mainstream society to any significant degree. However, Somali Bantus from the 
Shabelle river who have lived most of their life in places like Mogadishu, are much more 
integrated. Standard Somali is their mother tongue and they feel at home in the urban and 
modern life of Somali cities. They often have friends who are Somalis and have an easier time 
fitting in among Somalis.  
Some see their dependence on Somali society as a curse, forcing them to work for and 
serve their oppressors. But others are willing and able to use their cultural and social capital for 
their benefit in finding work or receiving financial assistance in times of need. These community 
members might be able to act as bridges for the rest of the community, improving access to 
opportunities and resources within Somali society for others.  
One Somali Bantu woman I met had worked as a house helper for a number of Somali 
families and through that experience had built a knowledge base of potential employers and 
their expectations. This knowledge enabled her to connect other women to Somali employers 
and to help them navigate the challenges of this work. Another Somali Bantu woman expressed 
 
12 This study was too limited in scope to assess the extent to which members of different subgroups are willing to 
work together. I was, however, able to observe several friendships between Somali Bantu from different 
subgroups that resulted in sharing of social and cultural resources, which confirmed the assertion of interview 
participants that such collaboration was possible and beneficial (see page 83). My recommendations on resource 
sharing among Somali Bantu are based on these findings and the general consensus among interview participants 
of a common identity across subgroups. 
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that Somali employers are more likely to mistreat an employee when they assume that the 
person is isolated and helpless. Having another Somali Bantu broker the work agreement helps 
the employer know that the person has a social support system in place and also gives them a 
mediator in case of conflict, lowering the potential of abuse.  
These are just some ways in which Somali Bantus who are more integrated into Somali 
society might offer their resources to other Somali Bantu to better navigate life and work within 
the larger Somali community of Eastleigh. 
Kenyan Society 
While Somali Bantus from Mogadishu have an easier time interacting with ethnic 
Somalis, they often have less understanding and experience of Kenyan culture. Many have only 
arrived in the country in last five years and have spent most of their time within Eastleigh. Most 
don’t speak any English or Swahili, the two national languages of Kenya, and don’t know much 
about Kenyan institutions. Most interactions with government agencies, be it RAS, the police, of 
public schools and hospitals, require the ability to connect with and negotiate with the 
individual officer, a skill that is only learned over time.  
Somali Bantus from the Juba river have often spent ten or more years living in the 
refugee camps, regularly interacting both with refugees from other countries and with Kenyan 
staff providing services to refugees. Many young adults have spent years in the Kenyan school 
system, or interacted with Kenyan camp authorities. While life in the camp does not provide 
the experience of living within Kenyan society proper, it does prepare refugees for some 
aspects of life in Nairobi, and in many cases they at least understand Swahili and English, even if 
they might not speak much.  
108 
While this cultural capital within Kenyan society is very limited, it does offer a few 
opportunities to refugees in Nairobi, where those who are most comfortable among Kenyans or 
most familiar with Kenyan institutions might have the capacity of assisting others in the 
community as they navigate life in urban Kenya. Most refugees in Nairobi do not have the time 
or resources to pursue further education and are forced to pick up language and other skills 
while working, which can be a daunting task in the Somali community of Eastleigh. Those with 
prior knowledge and skills from the camps can draw upon their experience for their own sake, 
but also sometimes act as cultural guides to other community members. Yet overall, Kenyan 
society remains largely untapped as a resource for Somali Bantu refugees in Nairobi, and there 
might be many opportunities waiting for those determined enough to connect with their 
Kenyan neighbors. 
Diaspora 
A good number of Somali Bantu refugee in Nairobi do not have any close relatives in the 
USA, but for those that do have immediate family members in the diaspora, this connection 
presents a very significant and valuable resources. Even though Somali Bantus in the US often 
struggle themselves to make end meet and don’t have much capacity to send remittances, they 
are often able to assist in an emergency and some are willing to invest in business ventures in 
Kenya. A significant one-time cash flow from the diaspora can be all that is needed for a 
refugee in Nairobi to start their own business and change their trajectory from simple survival 
to modest progress. In some cases, the investment into a business is large enough that the new 
business owner can even hire one or two other community members, thereby creating new 
jobs and providing income to several families.  
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A few refugees in Nairobi get modest but regular remittances on a monthly basis. These 
are primarily wives of US-based Somali Bantu men, who send them money for housing and daily 
expenses. While these women are very few compared to the overall size of the Somali Bantu 
community, their financial security enables them to engage in the valuable work of community-
building by hosting friends and spending time socializing. Their homes are some of the nicest 
and largest in the community, making them favored spaces for social activities and places of 
refugees for those in need. While these women don’t necessarily have the personality and 
ambition to center community networks around themselves, they contribute an important non-
financial resource to their friend group and beyond.  
Camp Community 
The social networks and friend groups that have developed over the years in the 
refugee camps might be the most important resources for the young men and women from 
those camps seeking work in Nairobi. Unfamiliar with city life and inexperienced in the 
workspace, they are able to survive and succeed mostly because of their friends who have gone 
to Nairobi ahead of them, as well as their families who stayed behind. Friend groups in Nairobi 
share housing and food with each other, give advice and guidance on finding jobs, and provide 
moral and emotional support in difficult times. The families in the camps also provide 
emotional support via regular communication, in addition to giving the motivation to persevere 
through hardships. It is these connections to friends from the camps that often form the basis 
of business partnerships. Coming together in the house of a friend with a US-based husband to 
celebrate a holiday or even gathering for a small wedding celebration strengthens the ties 
within friend groups and provide opportunities to include others, as well.  
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While the time and energy to socialize is limited for many Somali Bantus, there are some 
in the community who not only stay connected with their close friends, but expand their social 
networks to others. These are the people who bridge the networks between different sub-
groups, connecting people from the camps with those from Mogadishu, and creating a stronger 
sense of a common identity and unity within the community.  
Service Providers 
As mentioned in the text, there are a number of NGOs in Nairobi that provide services 
to refugees. These services include food, rent, and household items to stabilize the most 
vulnerable, business training and business grants, medical and psychosocial services, and 
others. As I document, while most Somali Bantus in Nairobi are not eligible for these services 
and the remaining ones face high barriers to accessing assistance from NGOs, a few community 
members might be able to benefit from them. By providing more information to the refugee 
community regarding the services available and the processes to obtain them, NGO resources 
might enable some Somali Bantus to get temporary support with housing or medical needs, or 
to receive the training and the starting capital for a business.  
More importantly, community organization and education might enable the Somali 
Bantus in Nairobi to approach NGOs as a community, to give voice to their needs and to point 
out barriers in access, and to potentially effect changes among service providers to better reach 
those who are vulnerable and empower the community as a whole. 
Conclusion 
This needs assessment, while exploratory and fragmentary, has resulted in some 
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actionable information for both service providers and refugees. A better identification of the 
needs of Somali Bantus in Nairobi, the barriers that prevent them from accessing existing 
resources, and the assets and opportunities that help them survive, represents not only a gap in 
the literature, but also a knowledge gap among NGO policy-makers. A better understanding of 
the current policies and processes of registration and documentation and of the existing NGO 
programs can benefit individual refugees and empower the Somali Bantu community. 
Recommendations to NGOs 
Considering the fact that it has become virtually impossible for new arrivals to be 
registered as refugees in Nairobi as well as the factors pushing camp refugees to move to the 
city (such as the shortening of food rations), refugee-serving NGOs should seriously reconsider 
their current policy of only assisting those who are authorized to be in Nairobi. For one, a better 
integration of camp and urban services would take account of the reality of mixed urban-camp 
families and hopefully lead to more relevant services (for example, tailoring livelihood 
programs in camps to improve work retention in Nairobi). More importantly, in recognizing the 
trajectory of government policies and the effects on those fleeing violence and insecurity, there 
is a strong humanitarian case to be made for services offered to those without documentation 
in Nairobi.  
In addition, refugee-serving NGOs should reconsider their advertisement and 
recruitment strategies within the refugee communities of Nairobi. This study has indicated that 
as many as 80% of Somali Bantu refugees are not aware of the available services, a finding that 
should fuel further research into the extent and reasons of the failure of information 
dissemination, as well as the development of strategies to improve the current situation. 
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Rather than relying on artificially created community structures among refugee groups that 
ignore historic realities of internal marginalization and exploitation, NGOs should focus on 
identifying and including those on the fringes of refugee communities and overcoming social 
isolation among the most vulnerable. 
It is not clear what assumptions drive the efforts of refugee-serving NGOs to be 
geographically and physically difficult to access by refugees. There might be a legitimate 
concern of being overrun by ineligible migrants or to be targeted by disgruntled clients. 
Nevertheless, it seems clear that requiring refugees to spend significant time and money to 
travel to NGO offices excludes those most at need of assistance. Making services truly 
accessible to vulnerable populations should include having a visible presence within the 
neighborhoods where refugees actually live in. 
Finally, the policy of willful ignorance towards the social hierarchies and conflicts within 
refugee communities should be re-evaluated. Refugee NGOs should consider including social 
and cultural structures and dynamics of different refugee groups in the orientation and training 
of their staff to ensure that service providers are able to identify and address instances of 
discrimination and marginalization among their clients. This would also include increased 
vetting and training of staff recruited from refugee communities and related groups (such as 
Kenyan Somalis) to avoid bias or corruption among NGO staff. 
Recommendations to the Community 
Somali Bantu refugees in Nairobi operate on very tight margins in terms of social and 
financial resources, and recommendations to the community needs to take these limitations 
seriously. It is not realistic to advise plans of action to these refugees that are simply 
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unachievable. Nevertheless, the study has revealed some areas were small changes could 
improve the situation of Somali Bantu refugees in Nairobi and potentially benefit the 
community as a whole.  
A first step could be to ‘organize’ the community by creating some very basic structures. 
This could involve a community-wide social media group to facilitate awareness and 
communicate information, as well as the appointing of a leadership committee or at least a 
spokesperson to represent the community towards external organizations and institutions. 
Such an organizing would strengthen and expand social bonds within the community and 
increase the likelihood of community access to NGO services. 
A second step could be to facilitate dialogue between different sub-groups. Recognizing 
the different strengths of camp-based and urban-origin Somali Bantu refugees and building the 
trust to communicate and share those strengths could benefit each side. While there are some 
linguistic and cultural barriers to overcome between refugees from the Juba and the Shabelle 
river, a common ethnic identity already exists, and increased dialogue might result in social 
partnerships and resource-sharing. If community members could make their knowledge of 
Somali society, Kenyan society, the humanitarian regime, and the diaspora available to more 
people within their extended networks, it would increase the overall social and cultural capital 
of the Somali Bantu community. Increased trust-building and information-sharing might 
ultimately lead to instances of inter-community partnership, bringing together members from 
different subgroups and even the diaspora to pursue common business ventures or advocacy 
efforts. 
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Recommendations for Further Research 
As this study was only exploratory, it has opened up many new questions that need to 
be investigated. Follow-up interviews could clarify surprising or ambiguous findings (for 
example, the claim that mothers can’t entrust each other with childcare) or investigate outliers 
in the data (for example, Somali Bantus with higher educational backgrounds), and quantitative 
research could shed more light on the extent of some of the findings. Further research might 
focus on subgroups among the participants, such as an in-depth study of domestic workers and 
their work environment, or young families and the decision-making process regarding child-
raising, education, and healthcare. Other research might focus on specific needs or resources 
within the community, for example a more detailed study of refugee access to NGO services or 
the extent and nature of refugee interactions with Kenyan hosts. 
In addition to further research of the same refugee population in Eastleigh, a more 
complete study of Somali Bantu refugees in Kenya would include studies of communities in 
other parts of Nairobi such as Kangemi or Kawangware, and in other urban centers of Kenya 
such as Mombasa or Kitale. A longitudinal study would shed more light on the development of 
the urban communities over time, as well as the impact of new immigration policies or other 
major events. Analyzing the effects of the Covid-19 pandemic on the refugee community in 
Eastleigh might be one example of such a follow-up study. 
Finally, a second study might investigate the effects of the initial needs assessment on 
the community. The townhall meetings in the initial stages of the research design and the 
interviews themselves might have already initiated dynamics of community organization, or 
conversely emphasized differences among various sub-groups. The presence of a white, 
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Western researcher within the community over several months might have had an impact in 
itself. Understanding the effects of research on the community might be valuable to inform 
future studies and could potentially increase the positive effects of participatory research 
within the community. 
Personal Reflections 
This thesis represents the final step in a long process of studying applied anthropology, a 
process that happened simultaneously to my work with refugee populations in Kenya. As a 
result, a number of class projects and the applied thesis research all happened within my 
broader work environment, and my role within my work and within the refugee community 
gradually evolved over the years of my journey towards becoming an anthropologist. Rather 
than just appearing in a new setting as a researcher, I started this project with a long history of 
personal experiences and interactions, and often had to negotiate between my existing roles as 
colleague and friend, and my new role as anthropologist. Being able to draw on personal 
experiences and social contacts within the refugee community in Nairobi was, of course, a huge 
benefit in my research. Not only was I able to analyze and interpret my data based on these 
experiences, but I was also able to build on existing trust and rapport, and whenever I got to 
the limits of my (hopefully growing) abilities as a researcher, I was able to just switch into the 
role of friend. 
Conducting research in a place like Eastleigh, where many other anthropologists, 
political scientists, psychologists, and others have worked in the past, can be intimidating. Not 
only is there a broad literature so close to my study focus to live up to, but I also encountered 
refugees with previous experiences of being researched or of assisting in research projects. 
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This, of course, shaped expectations, and at least once I was quite happy to take clues from one 
of my refugee friends on ‘how research is conducted around here.’ At the same time I had 
found a niche within the refugee community that had been largely overlooked by previous 
research, and at times I felt the weight of responsibility to give voice to the marginalized in an 
arena that was already so saturated with high-quality studies. 
This study is, of course, limited by the fact that I am new to the enterprise of 
anthropological research. While the quality of my interviews and my participant observation 
improved over the course of the study as I gained more experience and learned from early 
mistakes, I have no illusions that an experienced team hired by one of the larger refugee 
agencies in town could have produced much broader and more detailed needs assessment. 
Nevertheless, the project was both satisfying and meaningful on a personal and professional 
level. Listening to people who felt left out and forgotten sometimes proved significant in itself 
as it gave them the feeling of being taken seriously and an opportunity to reflect on their 
situation. More than once a refugee told me that my questions had helped them to become 
more aware of what was happening in the community or to come up with new ideas on how to 
improve their situation. That, in itself, has made this research worthwhile to me. In addition, it 
was rewarding to be able to share my findings with representatives of several different NGOs at 
the end of the project, which gave me hope that the messages given to me by interview 
participants might actually get the attention of decision-makers and lead to some amount of 
change.  
Most anthropological studies of refugees in Kenya are academic, and most NGO reports 
on refugees in Kenya are not anthropological. By discussing my research and my findings with 
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friends from the NGO community, I reaffirmed my belief that applied anthropology has 
something important to offer to the work of refugee NGOs in the region. Being able to look at a 
particular situation from a very holistic perspective and to discover along the way which 
questions are actually significant to finding solutions has allowed my project to uncover data 
that most service providers were completely oblivious to. At the same time, I was able to 
benefit a lot from concepts and ideas developed by other disciplines.  
On a personal level, I have benefitted immensely by the process of studying 
anthropology and applying my new skills to my work environment. I have learned so much not 
just about the refugee community itself, but also about how to look at their situation from new 
perspectives. I am confident that the process of this project has helped me just as much as the 
actual findings at being better in my job. At the same time, anthropology has taught me a lot 
about reflexivity and positionality. I have become more aware of the immense privilege my 
passport, my white skin, and my socioeconomic background afford me, and hopefully I have 
avoided at least some inconsiderate remarks or actions as a result. Learning to live in the 
tension between my privilege and the experiences of those I research has been and continues 
to be very difficult, and I still struggle with finding appropriate responses to the needs and 
challenges I encounter on a regular basis. Especially as I recognize the limits of my ability to 
understand and emphasize, I am very grateful for the patience and kindness I have experienced 
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